

The Department of State

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July 16, 1956



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The Department of State bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Our Partnership in Creating a World of Peace

Address by Vice President Nixon¹

Mrs. Nixon and I are singularly honored in being invited to participate in your celebration of the 10th anniversary of the independence of your courageous nation. It is fitting that we who fought side by side in Bataan and Corregidor should celebrate jointly our days of independence. You are a young nation, but already the wisdom and insight of your counsel is appreciated throughout the entire world. You are known for your devotion to freedom, your courage and integrity in fighting for ideals, your determination to live up to the highest standards of liberty and democracy. We who share your ideals are proud that you have asked us to be here with you on this happy occasion.

I come to you as a representative of a nation that cherishes your friendship and partnership. And I come especially as the representative of our beloved President, Dwight D. Eisenhower. As you know, he is happily recovering from an operation that prevented his being with you today. But he asked me, on the very day I left for Manila, to bring his fondest greetings to President Magsaysay and to the Philippine people. He recalls the 4 years he spent in your country from 1936 through 1939, and he values the many friendships he made at that time among the Filipino people. He wants you to know how impressed he is with your magnificent accomplishments in such a short time. You have his very best wishes as you progress into the future with courage and confidence.

I know I speak for the President and all Americans in paying tribute to the splendid administration of President Magsaysay. He is known

throughout the world, not only for his splendid conduct of the internal affairs of your Republic but also for his work in drawing up the Pacific Charter. Here was a bold stroke for freedom.

This was your declaration of independence, not only from the old colonialism of the last century but also from the far worse Communist colonial imperialism of today. We who stand shoulder to shoulder with you in this common fight for the survival of all that we cherish are proud of your leadership in producing this great charter.

May I add a personal note. Mrs. Nixon and I will never forget our previous visit to your country 3 years ago and the warmth and friendliness of your reception. Everywhere we went we felt completely at home. There is a Spanish phrase of welcome which many of you will recognize—"Estan ustedes en su casa"—"You are in your own home." That is exactly how we felt during all the time we were in your country. In the cities and in the barrios, in your schools, factories, and farms we met hundreds of people. We feel, as does your President, that the real way to know a people is to meet those in all walks of life, as well as their official representatives. Our meetings with you are deeply engraved in our memories. Long after we leave public life, Mrs. Nixon and I will remember and cherish your friendship.

May I add one final word of tribute. Just as we in the United States recognize George Washington as the Father of our Country, we honor today in the Philippines a dedicated patriot and hero, Manuel Quezon. To him goes the credit for the agreement that led to the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935. Eleven years later, the independence to which Manuel Quezon had devoted so much of his life became a

¹ Made on the 10th anniversary of the independence of the Republic of the Philippines at Manila on July 4 (press release 373 dated July 3).

great reality. Our nations were close partners before your independence, but we feel that we are even closer together today.

Problems of Youthful Nations

Because on this occasion we are jointly celebrating the day on which our two countries acquired their independence, I think it is appropriate for us to review some of the problems which newly independent countries face if they are to attain the goals for which they made such great sacrifices. Let us consider first the problems which face the youthful nations. It is significant to note that your problems are very much like those we faced 170 years ago, when we celebrated our 10th anniversary as a free nation.

At that time we knew that we were economically and militarily weak. But in spite of this weakness we were fiercely proud of our independence. The American people and Government felt then that might does not make right, that strength of armies is no substitute for honor and integrity, and that reason and justice should prevail in relations among nations. And we believe in those same principles today just as passionately as we did 180 years ago.

Some may consider us naive when we speak of God-given rights, of the dignity of man, and of the equal sovereignty of all peoples. If these are simple views, then we are proud to be a simple people. We know that you will share these views, for you too believe that the greatness of nations is judged by eternal standards of right and wrong and not by the accidents of military and economic power.

Both our nations faced grave internal problems after our independence. Both were weakened by the cruel blows of war. Both had to suffer the indignity of occupation by foreign troops. But we also share in common a rebirth from the ruin and devastation of war. We built up our economies, restored law and order, and started the orderly political and economic development of our nations.

Our two countries were alike in another way. We in the United States had the problem of our Tories, who were still loyal to a foreign ruler. Yours was a far greater problem. The authority of your Government was defied by the Huks. Many of these rebels, as you know, were simple people, led astray by their leaders. But among

the leaders were men who were not truly Filipinos. They owed first allegiance to the materialistic, ruthless, foreign ideology of Communist colonial imperialism. You fought the menace with great wisdom. You used military force where necessary, but you also removed the political and economic causes of discontent. In this effort your President, Ramon Magsaysay, played a leading part. For this he has won the admiration of the whole free world. He showed how communism can and should be successfully fought—not simply by being against it but by beating the Communists in the very area they are trying to exploit—creating a better life for the people of a nation.

In spite of the time and energy consumed by these efforts, and the resources devoted to defense, you have made remarkable economic progress in the last 10 years. We are proud of the fact that, according to an economic survey published by the United Nations, during the years 1946 to 1956 the Philippines had the highest annual rate of production growth of any country in the Far East.

Strength Through Collective Security

Let us now consider some of the problems confronting other nations who are charting their course on the newly found seas of independence. Some of these nations have raised a question as to whether their countries can be truly independent and be allied with a free-world power like the United States. Through the years they have become suspicious of the Western powers, feeling that any alliance with them might jeopardize their hard-won independence.

Both of us can understand this feeling, since we both have known colonial status. Yet our partnership during the last 10 years is proof that alliance with an overseas power that holds the same standards of freedom and democracy can help both parties equally. We are friends. We are allies. We are equals. In our dealings there is not now and there must never be any so-called Big Power-Little Power or Big Brother-Little Brother relationships. Our alliance has not infringed upon your independence. On the contrary, it has strengthened it.

I hope that other nations will study this example carefully and realize what it means to walk side by side with the United States of America. Let them contrast your strength and security with

the fate of small nations who were not united with us in mutual alliances. You are independent. But are Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania independent? Is there any freedom in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania?

How much liberty is there in North Korea or North Viet-Nam? What has happened to ancient Tibet? We must all frankly face this question: Where there is a threat of Communist colonial imperialism, is a nation really safe in striking out alone? I know that, if I were an executive in a newly independent nation, I would ponder this question with the utmost care. You know that, in our efforts to promote collective security, we are not defending a discredited and repudiated colonialism. We have declared our belief in the right of all peoples to govern themselves. We feel that progress toward self-government should be resolute and continuous. Some peoples may wish a completely independent existence. Others may choose to govern themselves in some kind of association with older states. In modern times the really cruel colonialism has been the colonialism of the Communist world. It has enslaved over a dozen nations and has left hundreds of millions to suffer the harshest forms of tyranny. It has not only captured their bodies but tried to dominate their minds and kill their souls.

What has checked the expansion of Communist colonial imperialism? To answer this question, look at Western Europe. Eight years ago, Western Europe was a cluster of weak nations, inviting invasion and aggression. The pattern of Czechoslovakia could have been repeated over and over again. But it was not repeated. Why? Because, in the first place, your good partner, the United States, intervened strongly to protect Greece and Turkey. Then it asked these free nations to band together in a pattern of collective security. Thanks to NATO and aid from the United States, Western Europe can breathe securely today. These are the facts. Yet the agents of Communist colonialism have the supreme audacity to suggest to the ancient and honored nations of the East that our offers of help are a form of imperialism! Is that what happened in Korea? Are we subjugating the Free Republic of Viet-Nam? You need but look around you to find the answers to these questions.

Anniversary of Philippine Independence

Following is the text of a letter from President Eisenhower to Philippine President Magsaysay on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the independence of the Philippine Republic.

JUNE 27, 1956

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It gives me the greatest personal pleasure to extend to Your Excellency and to the people of the Philippines the congratulations and sincere good wishes of the people of the United States on the tenth anniversary of Philippine independence.

We are honored to share this day with our sister republic and proud indeed of the fine progress it has made under your leadership in its march toward national development. We are confident that the firm attachment of the Philippines to the ideals of democracy and human freedom which have guided the Republic so well during the trials of the first decade of independence will assure fulfillment of its goals in the next.

In my stead, I have asked Vice President Nixon to represent the warm sentiments of the American people for the Philippines.

With assurance of my high esteem,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

His Excellency

RAMON MAGSAYSAY

*President of the Republic of
the Philippines
Manila*

At the same time, we might ask another question: What would have happened if the free nations had not joined in defending Korea? Who would feel safe in Asia today if this one small country had been overrun? We all know that this was a test of collective security. And we are proud that the free nations of the world met this test. And may I say that your own soldiers played an honored part in this defense against aggression. Once again we fought together for the freedom of all of us.

Neutralism and Independence

We have heard recently a great deal of discussion of the attitude that goes by the name of neutralism. Let us see how it bears on the problem of independence. I would feel that generally a nation that rejects the principles of collective security because it feels its independence will be

compromised by association with other powers is not reading rightly the trends of modern history. It has far more to gain by standing together with free nations than by remaining aloof. But there may be other reasons for neutralism. Many nations have the same principles which we share in common, and they are prepared to defend them; yet they feel that their own internal problems compel them to abstain, at least for the moment, from mutual-security pacts and associations. They wish to devote all their energies to building their own political and economic systems. Or they may feel that they are too geographically exposed to risk provoking Communist colonial imperialism.

We believe in the right of each individual nation to chart its own course, and we respect whatever decision it makes even though we might not fully agree with that decision. It is only natural that we should feel closer to those who stand with us as allies in the effort to keep the world free. But we, just as you, cherish also the friendship of other nations who share our dedication to the principles of democracy and freedom even though they have not seen fit to ally themselves with us politically and militarily.

Is Freedom the Same as Tyranny?

But there is still another brand of neutralism that makes no moral distinction between the Communist world and the free world. With this viewpoint, we have no sympathy. How can we feel toward those who treat alike nations that believe in God and honor religion and morality, and nations that boast of atheism and the rule of force and terror alone? How can anyone treat as equals those who believe in the dignity of man and the basic rights of all men, and those who treat their subjects as mere machines? Is democracy to be equated with dictatorship? Is freedom the same as tyranny?

There are faults in the nations of the free world, and we all know and deplore them. But can anything that we have done compare with the history of communism recently portrayed by Nikita Khrushchev himself? The Communists have convicted themselves out of their own mouths. Even their lackeys, the Communist Parties throughout the world, have been forced to repudiate publicly this shameful record. Yet this is not the story of one man alone. It is inherent in Communist

dictatorship. It follows of necessity from the principles of Marx and Lenin, which the present collective leadership of the Soviet Union still embraces.

I shall not judge those who put communism and freedom in the same category. History shall judge them much better than I can. I hope that no leader of a free people will adopt this line. Should he do so, however, I hope that he realizes that he endangers the security of his nation. For we believe, as you do, that godless Communist imperialism is evil in itself and a threat to the liberty and aspirations of free people everywhere.

I know there are those who feel that friendly neutrality toward the Kremlin and Peiping may spare them. But you know the proverb: He who sups with the devil must have a long spoon. The Communists have been ruthless toward the people of the nations that they have engulfed. They have no memory of former favors, no kindness toward those who tried to be friendly. They are cold and calculating masters. Those who feel that they can outmaneuver them are taking a fearful risk.

We hope that all the nations of Asia will understand our attitude toward collective security. In this regard, you can play a leading role in interpreting our views and intentions to your neighbors. You have two great advantages in this regard. First, you have been our friends and partners during these years of independence. Second, your culture is a happy blend of the best of the West and East. You are familiar with the ancient culture of Europe. You know and understand our habits in the United States. Yet, at the same time you are an Asian people, with all the gracious qualities of Asian culture.

Like your fellow Asians, you are a spiritual people. You have a sense of beauty and a deep understanding of history. You honor family life and respect the traditions of the past. With this happy blend of great cultures, you can be a bridge between East and West. You can help to remove the misunderstandings and hostility based on past errors. You can speak for us as one who knows and understands.

The awakening and emergence of Asia is one of the most striking and important world developments since the end of World War II. Along with the Republic of the Philippines, one nation after another has achieved full independence.

Today the new states are addressing their energies and wills to the difficult problems involved in advancing the general welfare of their peoples. The dimensions of these problems challenge the imagination. Hundreds of millions of people in this vast area believe for the first time that, through their own efforts, but with some outside assistance, they can rise above the level of life which their ancestors knew for centuries. The will to succeed in these bold new programs is manifest, for Asians today see a vision and are determined that the vision shall materialize. It will not materialize this year; it may not in some cases materialize to any significant degree for a generation; but Asians know that some day it shall.

In fulfilling this vision Asia will realize its great potential. Communism has achieved economic gains in some areas of the world, but in order to achieve them it has sacrificed the liberties and sacred aspirations which are cherished by human beings. For this fundamental reason, communism is out of step with Asia's march toward the realization of its vision, because the people of Asia will never tolerate substituting for the old-style colonialism from which they have acquired independence the much more tyrannical Communist colonial imperialism which the fanatical men in Peiping and Moscow are attempting to impose on all the world.

We in the United States, on the other hand, are proud to state that we share wholeheartedly the true aspirations of the people of Asia and of other newly developing areas to realize their dreams of economic progress. We shall welcome the opportunity to be of assistance where our help is desired in reaching those goals. And our help is offered always in this spirit: The United States wants nothing which belongs to any other people or nation in the world. We want no economic satellites, no subservient lackeys in the council of nations. The only war we want to launch is the war against poverty, disease, ignorance, and fear wherever it exists.

Asia is everywhere on the march. The spirit of the newly independent Asian nations is the spirit of the signers of the American Declaration of Independence 180 years ago today, who proclaimed to the world:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are

Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

We are proud that on this day we jointly celebrate our independence with a people who share with us dedication to a goal worthy of great nations—a peaceful world in which individuals can be free, nations can be independent, and peoples can live together in peace, prosperity, and friendship.

Strengthening Military Bases in the Philippines

Following is the text of a joint statement released at Manila on July 3 by Vice President Nixon and Ramon Magsaysay, President of the Republic of the Philippines.

Vice President Nixon has discussed with President Magsaysay the necessity for strengthening military bases in the Philippines in order to bolster the common defense of the two countries as well as that of the Free World in this area. President Magsaysay concurred in the need for such a step for the mutual benefit of both countries. The President and the Vice President agreed that the two Governments will hold formal negotiations on military bases in the near future, and that these negotiations will be conducted on the basis of the following general principles:

(1) The existence of a system of United States bases in the Philippines has been, and continues to be, a matter of mutual interest and concern to the two countries, for the purpose of insuring their common defense pursuant to the principles of the United Nations.

(2) In consonance with this mutuality of interest and concern, certain land areas in the Philippines have been and are being used by the United States as bases. The Philippine Government will contribute, for use in accordance with the terms of the Military Bases Agreement, the additional land which is deemed necessary by both Governments for the strengthening of the base system; the United States will turn over to the Philippine Government those areas listed in the Military Bases Agreement which the parties may hereafter agree are no longer needed. In addition, the United States has contributed and will contribute

such personnel, equipment and physical facilities as may be necessary for the effective maintenance of such bases for the defense of the Philippines and the United States in this area.

(3) The United States has, since the independence of the Philippines, always acknowledged the sovereignty of the Philippines over such bases; and expressly reaffirms full recognition of such Philippine sovereignty over the bases. Further, the United States will transfer and turn over to the Philippines all title papers and title claims held by the United States to all land areas used either in the past or presently as military bases, except those areas which may now or will be used by the United States for its diplomatic and consular establishment. Such transfer of title papers and title claims will not affect use of the bases in accordance with the terms of the Military Bases Agreement.

Commemorating Japanese Peace Treaty Signing

Remarks by Secretary Dulles¹

It is a very great pleasure and honor for me to have this opportunity to present, on behalf of the Department of State, a plaque commemorating the signing here 5 years ago, in 1951, of the Japanese Peace Treaty. The occasion is one that is, for me, full of many happy and significant memories, of which not the least is the pleasure which I always have in being in the City of San Francisco.

I think people from all over the world find this so. It is one of the bonds of unity which exists between the Soviet rulers and those of the free world, like us, who come to San Francisco. I recall that, when the question came up as to where the Japanese Peace Treaty should be signed, there was no problem at all in getting the Japanese

Peace Treaty signing to be held in San Francisco. And, when it was a question of discussing with Mr. Molotov in Vienna a little over a year ago as to where we would hold the commemoration ceremony of the 10th anniversary of the United Nations, it was no problem at all in getting them to come to San Francisco. All of us who have had the opportunity to know San Francisco look forward to getting back.

This Japanese Peace Treaty, upon which I had the opportunity and the honor of working at the request of President Truman, illustrates the bipartisan character of our efforts of peace. This treaty is, I think, a landmark in that never before in history has a great and cruel war, which engendered deep feelings on both sides, been resolved by treaty which was so much a treaty of reconciliation; a fact which the Consul General [Yasusuke Katsuno] has just recalled, and one which Premier Yoshida of Japan spoke of when he was here at the time. It was a treaty which put behind a spirit of vindictiveness and substituted a spirit of hope and reconciliation for the future.

There are many people who wonder about and who even question the role of moral principles in international affairs. And, if there are any who are today skeptical on the point, I suggest they read the addresses which were made at the peace conference by the representatives of the 49 governments who signed the treaty. That spirit was evident in practically all of the addresses which were made by the representatives of the 49 governments who subsequently signed the treaty. It is an act upon which I think all of us who had a part, and the governments who were included at the conference, can look back with deep satisfaction.

As I was just saying a few minutes ago talking to Kiwanis,² it is good to look back and see what it is that is motivated by the principles of religion. It is never enough just to look at the past; it is never good to be complacent upon the past. We look at the past with advantage only if looks inspire us as we go and show what we may have done that didn't take into account the mistakes that have been made so far. I believe that the peace treaty can serve us in both respects, reminding us of the evil of war and reminding us of what can be gained in reconciling and substi-

¹ Made at the War Memorial Opera House of San Francisco on June 21. The legend on the plaque unveiled by the Secretary reads: "This plaque is presented to the City of San Francisco by the Department of State on behalf of the Government of the United States of America to commemorate the use of the War Memorial Opera House of San Francisco for all plenary sessions of the Japanese Peace Conference. In this building on September 8, 1951, the Japanese Peace Treaty was signed by the representatives of forty-nine nations."

² BULLETIN of July 2, 1956, p. 3.

tuting amity where there was hatred, violence, and cruelty. That's a lesson we need always to learn and always to apply.

One of the greatest fallacies is that peace is had merely by wanting to have peace. Peace is hard to win; and peace never yet has been permanently won, for it takes many qualities like those we speak

of today. If ever we think the peace can be won without those qualities, then I assure you that peace is forever to be lost. I hope that this plaque, which I now have the opportunity to unveil, will remind us of the lessons to be learned out of war and peace, and that we shall at long last have peace which is just and honorable.

The United Nations and the Search for Disarmament

by Francis O. Wilcox

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

In speaking to you tonight about disarmament, I should purposely avoid use of that term for the most part. Rather, I should speak of the limitation, regulation, and control of arms. My reason is that "disarmament" is a word which can have misleading and inaccurate connotations. To some people it may present an image of a world without arms and therefore at peace. This, of course, is an oversimplification of the problem at least in two respects.

In the first place, the word "disarmament" as used in our negotiations does not mean and has never meant, even to its most enthusiastic proponents, the abandonment of armed forces. The maintenance of substantial armed strength is essential for internal security, for the fulfillment of international commitments, and for carrying out responsibilities in connection with the maintenance of international peace and security under the U.N. Charter.

In the second place, the relationship of disarmament to peace is a complex one. Indeed the possession of arms, under conditions of limitation and control, is probably the surest guaranty of peace. Weakness invites aggression. It is not the absence of arms but an effective system of limitation and control that we seek.

Nature and Urgency of the Problem

Secretary Dulles, earlier this year, stated that, in his considered view, "Disarmament is the most difficult and the most compelling of all world problems." For a decade now the question has been under consideration within the framework of the United Nations under articles 11 and 26 of the charter. These articles empower both the Security Council and the General Assembly to make recommendations on arms regulation and limitation to member states. As we look ahead, a variety of developments contribute to the sense of urgency with which we attempt to deal with the ever-mounting difficulties and the ever-mounting importance of a solution to this problem. Let me mention a few of these factors.

Already the task of limitation and control of armaments has been enormously complicated by the accumulation of nuclear stockpiles. These stockpiles, with relatively simple shielding, could be hidden beyond the range of presently known means of scientific detection.

Already we are confronted with the potential dangers inherent in the development of nuclear weapons capability by the Communist world as well as by the free.

Already stockpiles of fissionable materials sufficient to constitute grave danger are in being without international safeguards or regulations or controls. Delivery systems for both nuclear and

¹ Address made before the Norman Wait Harris Foundation Institute, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., on June 29 (press release 365).

conventional weapons are steadily improving.

Trends based on present developments need be projected only a little way into the future to anticipate further factors that must be taken into account in our plans today.

For instance, the steady accumulation of nuclear weapons stockpiles and of materials available for their manufacture constantly increases the danger to civilization that would arise from the outbreak of nuclear warfare. By this I mean that, if larger amounts of such materials are available, then greater quantities might be used in the heat of war, to the vast peril of nations and peoples and unborn generations in no way involved in the conflict.

We must consider, too, the prospects of development within the foreseeable future of missiles equipped with thermonuclear warheads and capable of traversing great distances. This development would drastically increase vulnerability to surprise attack and would diminish the utility of existing types of early-warning systems. By "early warning" I mean the 15 minutes which a nation will have to mobilize for defense and retaliation! And with this greater threat would come a much greater problem of control, since highly destructive missiles and their launching platforms could be hidden in small areas of ground space, in submarines, or in ships.

Nor is this all. We must look ahead to the possibility, as well, that, in the absence of control, atomic weapons may be widely diversified and fully integrated into the total structure, strategy, equipment, and training of military forces. As we move toward that time we may be headed toward a "point of no return" with respect to practical prospects of comprehensive control of nuclear weapons. In a world of military forces so organized and so equipped, reliance for defense upon conventional armaments would be as unrealistic as a proposal in 1917 that the Nation's defense be entrusted to the crossbow or even the flintlock musket of colonial days.

There is another compelling reason for the early establishment of effective controls. The time is approaching when nuclear weapons capabilities may exist in many quarters of the globe. A delicate balance might be tragically upset by a single intrusion of local passions or a single misjudgment by one of the sovereign authorities with access to the trigger that could launch a nuclear war. Ef-

fective controls would become far more costly and far more complex with the widening of areas to be inspected.

At the moment only three states possess the materials and the technical know-how to manufacture nuclear weapons. In another decade this number may be increased to as many as a dozen. If we do not take effective action fairly soon, the control problem may become academic.

Lastly, I think we should contemplate the rising cost curve of defense in a decade of uninhibited nuclear weapons development. The expense both in terms of research and development and in terms of installation and operation of adequate defenses against long-range missiles would be nothing short of colossal. Added to this, the size and complexity of a military establishment able to retaliate decisively even after absorbing such a blow must be considered in estimating the costs of defense against massive attack by such weapons.

Disarmament as a Safeguard of the National Security

In view of the unpleasant factors I have mentioned, our basic purpose in seeking an effective limitation of armaments is clear. It is to enhance the security of the United States with which the security of the entire free world is inseparably linked. That security requires that we maintain strength adequate to our defenses, our extensive commitments, and our responsibilities in the free-world coalition.

But such strength is not enough. The security that comes from an arms race is illusory, short lived, and fraught with increasing danger for reasons I have already described.

For deterrent power alone cannot eliminate, although it may importantly reduce, the danger of war. And a war fought in the nuclear age, with all the weapons that could be created and stockpiled during an unlimited arms race, could, as we know, threaten civilization itself.

I think it is important to realize that the danger of war arises in large part from the possibility of devastating surprise attack. Given the awful destructive power of modern weaponry, an aggressor nation, in the absence of inspection or control, might calculate that it could deliver a surprise initial blow of such proportions as to destroy the means of effective retaliation. The fact that the aggressor's calculation would be proved by events

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to be fatally wrong would be of small comfort to the victim. And it is the democracies of the world that have, by their whole scheme of values, traditionally been compelled to accept the first blows of war.

President Eisenhower's bold conception, set forth at Geneva last July,² represents in our view a means not only of building confidence but also of reducing the threat to our security which is posed by the danger of surprise attack. Major aggression seems far less likely if the aggressor is deprived of the advantage of surprise. It is improbable that preparation for an attack of such magnitude as to give hope of success could be concealed from aerial inspection.

Wars could also arise, of course, even if the threat of surprise attack were removed, from a series of actions and counteractions which neither side intended to lead to hostilities. Our objective is to reduce this danger through agreement on a balanced and safeguarded system of limitation, regulation, and control of armaments, applicable fairly to ourselves and others.

Such a system should not only reduce the likelihood of war, by lessening the terrible tensions which arise from an unlimited arms race. It should also reduce the threat to our security which would be posed in the event of nuclear conflict.

Without altering the balance of deterrent power, such a system would at once reduce capabilities for successful aggression. Eventually, the reductions should be of such a character, and the machinery for inspection and enforcement so effective, that no nation would be in a position to mount, or believe that it could mount, successful aggression against another.

There are those who argue, and I think with good logic, that it is not the arms race which produces international tensions. It is rather, they say, the political tensions between the Communist and the free-world countries which cause the competition for more lethal weapons. Reduce the former and you will automatically be on the way to eliminating the latter.

An effective plan for limitation of armaments should, it is true, reduce the threat to our security by virtue of its impact on international political conditions as well as on levels of armament. The spread of Communist ideologies which menace the

free world as a whole, and which contribute to the danger of war, is fostered by human want and fear. These ideologies seem to thrive on the lower standards of living that may be produced by an excessive burden of armaments, on the political and economic controls needed to sustain that burden, and on the fears, suspicions, and hatreds of a world in which unregulated weaponry imperils the very survival of the race. By alleviating these conditions, we may contribute to the process of peaceful change, which will eventually erode tyranny and thus help to create a peace that is just as well as lasting.

The early achievement of a substantial measure of disarmament would contribute to our Nation's security, not only by weakening tyranny but also by strengthening the free world. This would set free great resources for productive purposes. It would mean that a benign war could be waged effectively against hunger and disease and low standards of living. By these steps basic conditions of stability and cooperation among the free nations could be brought into being more quickly and surely.

The United States, no less than other free nations, would be strengthened by steps which would permit a substantial measure of disarmament. As we are able to curtail that burden, as taxes can be reduced or their proceeds devoted to internal improvements, our energies will be released for productive investments of benefit alike to the United States and to the world trading community of which it is a part.

Disarmament as an Integral Part of National Policy

I have tried to describe the impelling reasons which underlie our policy with respect to disarmament. Now let me indicate why I believe that this policy is a consistent and integral part of United States foreign policy as a whole.

The primary objective of foreign policy, as I conceive it, is to advance the national security of the United States in the broadest sense of that term. National security, of course, is a complex of many factors. Foremost, however, among its prerequisites is the maintenance of a just and lasting peace, and it is toward this goal that our foreign policy, including that part which concerns disarmament, is primarily directed.

² BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.

In pursuit of this objective the United States seeks *concurrently* both international agreement on disarmament—for reasons which I have indicated—and the resolution of other major international issues which perpetuate injustice and create tensions among states. I emphasize the word *concurrently*, for the two approaches to our goal are interdependent.

There is a Japanese proverb to the effect that “he who chases two rabbits at the same time fails to catch either one.” This may be quite true of rabbits but it is definitely not true of two objectives so delicately interrelated as political tensions and armaments. Any government which pursues one and ignores the other will soon find the error of its ways.

Armaments and armed forces, as I have said, reflect the fear, tension, and insecurity arising from the existence of other unresolved issues between nations. With the end of World War II, for example, our Armed Forces were reduced from 12½ million men to 1½ million men in the space of 2 years. They were not substantially enlarged until Communist aggression in Korea made such enlargement imperative. It is clear that disarmament is not independent of political developments.

On the other hand, to say that armaments are nothing more than a reflection of political tensions is to overstate the case. The unique character of modern weaponry makes the existence of unrestricted armaments a source of tensions in themselves, aggravating other issues and making their settlement more difficult. If the upward spiraling of tensions and armaments is to be successfully reversed, it must be by concurrent progress upon both elements of the interacting process.

In his statement of April 16, 1953, President Eisenhower, charting the course of United States policy, set forth this principle of concurrent progress toward disarmament and the relaxation of tensions. Expressing in vivid terms the dangers to humanity from present weapons and affirming our desire to divert expenditures to constructive ends, he recognized that it would be difficult to alter the armament situation markedly so long as the existing measure of suspicion and distrust remained.

He called for concrete deeds which would relax tension. He affirmed the readiness of the United States to do its just part. He went on to say that

“as progress in all these areas strengthens world trust, we could proceed concurrently with the next great work—the reduction of the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world.”

These principles are basic tenets of our policy today. While seeking to resolve other major international issues, we seek to move ahead on the problem of armaments in specific ways which need not wait.

More important is the relationship between the objectives of our disarmament policy and the moral foundation of our foreign policy as a whole. It is our firm policy to uphold and advance in every legitimate way the principles of individual rights and freedom upon which our Nation and the free world stand united. These policies and these principles require the achievement of an open and peaceful world relieved of its oppressive burden of arms. Such a world is at once an expression and a precondition for the fulfillment in the widest sense of ideals for which we stand.

These are appealing arguments particularly for those who would like to see our resources used for constructive purposes. Even so, we must never lose sight of the fact that, in recent years at least, world peace has rested upon the deterring power of American military and economic strength.

Over a century and a half ago Pascal wrote:

Right without might is weakness. Might without right is tyranny. What we must do, therefore, is to combine might with right, making what is right, mighty, and what is mighty, right.

This is wise counsel. In our quest for effective disarmament we must make sure that there is enough power on the side of law and order and justice in the world to keep the free world free.

Major Periods of Negotiation

The United States has pursued for a decade now within the United Nations framework the objective of securing agreement on practical measures of disarmament. In broadest terms this decade of negotiation may be considered as falling into three general periods.

The first of these periods, from 1946 to 1948, was characterized by the development of the United Nations Majority Plan. This plan was based closely upon the far-reaching propositions put forward by the United States which have come to be known as the Baruch Plan.

Unfortunately some people are prone to forget that the United States took this initiative when we alone possessed atomic weapons and the facilities to produce them.

You will recall that the Baruch Plan called for the centralization in an international authority of ownership or managerial direction of all fissionable materials capable of use for weapons purposes. The authority would license and supervise the use of fissionable materials for power reactors. These materials were to be disposed in such a way that no nation could gain a dominating margin by seizure of the materials within its borders. Enforcement authority would rest in the Security Council operating without the veto.

To these proposals the U.S.S.R. responded merely with condemnation and a call for a treaty outlawing the production and use of atomic weapons. It was the beginning of "Ban the Bomb and Trust the Russians," the familiar theme song played in several keys but with few variations for the next 10 years. The first report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, incorporating the essential elements of the Baruch Plan, met the deadening impact of a Soviet veto. Hopes remained high, however, and additional reports in 1947 and 1948 presented improvements and modifications of the plan. However, Soviet reactions soon convinced the world of the insincerity of Soviet participation in United Nations efforts to achieve valid nuclear controls.

There followed a 5-year period from 1948 to 1953 which can be characterized as one of discouraging deadlock, a period which reached its lowest ebb with the outbreak of Communist aggression in Korea in 1950.

While details of negotiations during the period are a matter of record, I would like to mention two salient features. One is the unflagging efforts of the Western powers to develop soundly based proposals capable of meeting every valid Soviet criticism. The other is the purely propaganda objectives pursued by the Soviet Union. The fact is that the Soviets *talked* about disarmament while building nuclear capabilities.

From the standpoint of the evolution of policy, one important development was the establishment, in line with the suggestion of President Truman in October 1950, of the present United Nations Disarmament Commission by merging the separate commissions on conventional and atomic weapons.

A third period, from 1953 to 1955, might be called a period of new approaches. Within this period various events, among them the end of the Korean War and the death of Stalin, brought changes in the political climate which were conducive to new approaches and to renewed hope that progress might be made.

The first authoritative expression of the central place of disarmament in United States policy in this period was the statement of President Eisenhower of April 16, 1953, to which I have already referred.

The first of the basically new approaches to arise was the President's "atoms for peace" speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 8, 1953. After indicating in a general way the order of magnitude of atomic weapons stockpiles and something of the potential destructiveness of modern weapons, he proposed the establishment of an international atomic energy agency. From cooperation in the peaceful uses of the atom he hoped might grow a greater readiness to join in the control of atomic weapons. Subsequent experience attests the productiveness of this approach, although its full benefits are still far from being realized.

The second basically new approach was introduced in 1955, when the President at the meeting of the Heads of Governments at Geneva put forward the "open skies" plan for mutual aerial reconnaissance and exchange of military information as a means of relaxing tensions and minimizing the danger of surprise attack.

This proposal was the further outgrowth of the intensive policy review which continues in process in various departments of the Government. As a result of a decision in 1955 that coordination at the Cabinet level was desirable and that extensive studies were required, the President had appointed Harold E. Stassen as special assistant for disarmament matters. Mr. Stassen had set up a small staff to assist him, and asked a number of the most competent authorities in American life to undertake a study of the requirements and methods of effective international control.

The President's proposal at Geneva was a creative response to the fact that the pace of technological progress had introduced new dimensions to the problem of control, particularly in the nuclear field. Older plans for inspection and control of nuclear material, which were based on total

accounting for production—past and present—had become technologically outmoded.

In the absence of international controls, it had been possible for a country seeking to evade prospective control to build up a hidden stock of atomic weapons and shield them in such a way as to be beyond the range of detection. After Ambassador Lodge had called attention to this problem in March 1955, the Soviet Union recognized the fact explicitly in its proposal of May 10, 1955,³ but still called for "prohibition" of weapons despite the impossibility of assuring that this could be done. Because of the margin of error under any system of accounting that has been devised, the amount of material that could be used for hidden weapons had increased year by year. With the passage of time, a crucial point had been reached at which this margin of error represented a dangerous military potential in nuclear weapons.

Other technological changes, as well, had outmoded earlier approaches to control. A relatively smaller amount of nuclear material could be made to produce greater yields of explosive power. The hydrogen bomb had entered the picture. Of most far-reaching significance, however, were the consequences and the cumulative effect of a decade of nuclear production proceeding without international control.

The Present Status of Disarmament Negotiations

Partial Approach to Disarmament

I have, up to this point, tried to outline man's efforts to cope with the stark realities and challenging opportunities of the first 10 years of the atomic age. These efforts, under Western leadership, have been carried on within the framework of the United Nations. I think we will all agree that the United Nations is the proper forum in which to tackle this formidable problem. For if there is any issue which clearly transcends national boundaries and the traditional sovereignty of states, it is the issue of the regulation and control of nuclear armaments.

Ten years of negotiation have so far failed to result in an agreed plan of control. I should like to stress, however, that this is not a failure chargeable to the United Nations. Certainly we should not blame the United Nations for the weaknesses

and the shortcomings of its members. It is, after all, up to the members themselves to reach agreement on a plan which the United Nations can then implement. For our part we feel that we have faithfully lived up to our commitments under the charter to find a fair, equitable, and workable solution.

As we entered 1956, the General Assembly under Western leadership overwhelmingly endorsed the practicality of a partial approach short of immediate adoption of a comprehensive disarmament plan as the most promising basis for negotiations.⁴ In simplest terms the approach is that we do all that can be done now, even while we continue to work toward comprehensive disarmament and while we tackle the scientific barriers and the barriers of distrust which now block a solution.

Now some people will argue that a piecemeal approach to disarmament is both misleading and dangerous. A little disarmament, the argument runs, like a little education, could be a very dangerous thing. It might tend to lull the free world prematurely into a very false feeling of security.

But since the wit of man has been unable thus far to devise an acceptable program of *comprehensive* disarmament, it seems logical to move ahead on whatever front we can. Before a child begins to run, he must first learn to walk.

In accordance with this approach and with the specific mandate of the General Assembly that priority should be given to such confidence-building measures as the Eisenhower plan and the Soviet plan for ground control posts, the United States has put forward during 1956 a variety of initiatives.

Preliminary Measures in U.S. Disarmament Program

In the first place, we have reaffirmed our willingness to implement both the aerial reconnaissance and ground inspection proposals endorsed by the General Assembly.

In the second place, we have proposed an immediate exchange for a test period of a small number of inspection personnel who could be used as members of inspection teams as soon as an inspection agreement is concluded.

In the third place, we have proposed the designation of small strips of territory in the United

³ *Ibid.*, May 30, 1955, p. 900.

⁴ For text of resolution, see *ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1956, p. 63.

States and the U.S.S.R. within which the feasibility of inspection systems would be tested.

Finally, as part of an air and ground inspection system, we have proposed advance notification of planned movements of armed units through international air or water or over foreign soil.

These may not seem to be far-reaching steps. Yet if any one of them were put into effect by the great powers, it would do much to erode the barriers of suspicion and distrust that have made successful negotiations impossible.

Reduction of Conventional Armaments

We are by no means confining our efforts to nuclear weapons. In the field of conventional armaments, in order to do all that can be done without waiting, the United States proposed this year in London an immediate beginning on important gradual reductions in armed forces under a sound agreement.⁵ It is our thought that arms, rather than men, are subject to supervision and control and that major armaments should be reduced under proper safeguards. We have suggested, as a basis for measuring this arms limitation, reducing armed manpower to force levels of 2.5 million men for the U.S.S.R. and the United States, with corresponding reductions for other states. This, I submit, is a concrete and practical beginning. Drastic reductions beyond this point can be carried out safely only as progress is achieved on important political issues.

It should never be forgotten, however, that manpower is the most elusive factor in the disarmament equation. The Soviet Union, for example, can make good propaganda capital from an announcement that it intends to reduce its armed forces by a million men. Actually, however, these men are fully trained and stand ready to return to service at a moment's notice. Unless the guns and tanks and planes that mold these men into active fighting units are also reduced, little real progress has been made. This is precisely why we believe the emphasis should be placed upon weapons rather than upon manpower.

The Nuclear Threat

Further initiatives, far-reaching in their im-

plications, have been made by the United States this year in the field of nuclear weapons.

In his letter of March 1 to Marshal Bulganin,⁶ the President stated that, in his judgment, our efforts must be directed especially to bringing under control the nuclear threat.

As an important step in this direction, and assuming the satisfactory operation of an air and ground inspection system, the United States would be prepared to work out, with other nations, suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world would no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons. The President suggested that this might be combined with his proposal of December 8, 1953, "to begin now and continue to make joint contributions" from existing stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic agency.

These measures, if carried out adequately, would reverse the present deplorable trend toward a constant increase in nuclear weapons overhanging the world. The President stated as the ultimate hope of this Government that all production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes. It is my hope that all the nations which may possess fissionable material will subscribe to this great objective.

The Problem of Radiation

One of the problems of the atomic age arises from the fact that many uses of atomic energy, peaceful or military, are accompanied by the production of radioactive materials, which though found to be of value in many fields can also be harmful.

Last June Ambassador Lodge proposed that the United Nations undertake to pool the world's knowledge about the effects of atomic radiation on human health. Upon United States initiative the General Assembly established a special scientific committee to collect, evaluate, and distribute reports received from governments on levels of radiation and scientific observations concerning the effects of radiation.⁷

The United States is cooperating to the fullest extent with the United Nations radiation com-

⁵ For texts of proposals submitted during the London meetings of the subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, Mar. 19-May 4, 1956, see U.N. doc. DC/83.

⁶ BULLETIN of Mar. 26, 1956, p. 514.

⁷ For an article on the committee's first meeting, see *ibid.*, May 21, 1956, p. 860.

mittee in the collection and dissemination of data on this subject. We believe the first step in dealing with any scientific problem is to mobilize resources, explore what is known, and point out what still needs to be done. The work of the committee, we believe, will stimulate further study by competent authorities, encourage the international exchange of information, and provide each nation with adequate data for reaching its own conclusions on the problem of radioactivity.

The United States believes, on the basis of its own extensive studies and others such as the recent report of the National Academy of Sciences, that properly conducted nuclear tests do not at present constitute a hazard to human health and safety.

Our Government, unlike the Soviet Union, provides warning by prior announcement of the start and location of its tests and works out in consultation with other states extensive safeguards. If a disarmament agreement can be reached to limit nuclear weapons under proper safeguards, the United States would, of course, be prepared to agree to restrictions on the testing of such weapons.

Importance of Inspection and Control

I would like to touch briefly on United States proposals for inspection. Adequate inspection and control is a key principle underlying all our proposals in the disarmament field.

It is our firm conviction that there should be inspection for the purpose of providing against great surprise attack, insuring compliance with such measures as may be agreed upon, and providing the necessary basis for successive steps in achieving comprehensive disarmament.

We believe that an effective system in this age of jet planes and nuclear weapons, and in view of the expanse of territories involved, must include air inspection as well as ground inspection and some form of budgetary control.

We believe inspection should encompass forces maintained outside the national boundaries by signatory states as well as those within their boundaries.

We do not believe, however, that inspection should be any more extensive than is necessary to achieve the objectives of the disarmament agreement of which it is a part.

Now I realize full well that the Soviets have

said that they cannot tolerate the intrusion of American aerial inspection over their territories. Khrushchev has made this point quite effectively by suggesting that the United States should not try to look in everybody's bedroom and everybody's garden. I also realize that the Soviets have their own legitimate defense and security needs. However, we are not proposing anything that we are not willing to be subjected to ourselves.

Some people may wonder why we have attached such importance to an effective system of inspection and control. The reason is not far to seek. The purpose of arms limitation and control is to increase the security of nations, not decrease it. It is to provide real security, not false security. It is to build trust, not distrust.

This being the case, we believe that no nation should be expected to reduce its armed strength on the basis of paper promises that other countries will do the same.

Where We Stand

Although no concrete agreements came from the recent London sessions of the disarmament subcommittee, there were advances and clarifications in positions in the course of negotiations which may serve as a basis for future progress.

For example, at London there was for the first time apparent Soviet acceptance of the principle that a ground inspection system should be in place before disarmament begins. There was, for the first time, a Soviet definition, not as yet fully adequate, of what are called the "objects of control," that is, the operations and installations to be subject to inspection. Also, at London the Soviets seemed to have abandoned their 10-year-old "ban the bomb" proposal as an immediate objective, although this theme seems to be emerging again in some of their statements of the past few weeks.

Negotiations at London produced better understanding by the two sides of their respective positions, and seeds planted by Western initiatives and new approaches put forward there may yet bear fruit when given further study by Soviet leaders.

When arguing with an opponent it is well to know just where you disagree. There were three major areas of disagreement with the Soviets at London: the need for inspection, particularly of air inspection; the necessity for progress toward political settlements simultaneous with disarma-

ment measures involving far-reaching reductions; and apparent Soviet unwillingness to take any practical measures now to bring the nuclear threat under control.

The latest development is the Soviet announcement of May 14 concerning projected reductions in force levels, and their letter of June 6 to President Eisenhower transmitting this announcement.^{*} The letter is under study and the President will, of course, give his personal attention to the reply. At this stage, I can only speculate, personally and unofficially as a fellow student of world affairs, as to some of the possible implications of the announcement and the letter.

In their reductions of forces, if carried out, the Soviet Union is, of course, merely following belatedly the lead of the United States and its principal allies. Soviet calls for extensive reductions on our part must be viewed in the light of this fact. As I have already mentioned, the United States has reduced its forces since World War II by over 9 million men, from a level higher than the Soviet Union to a level substantially below.

On the positive side, the Soviet force reductions, if carried out, may indicate Soviet recognition of the fact that the United States, despite propaganda charges to the contrary, will not attack them. If this is the case the reductions may foreshadow a possible willingness to negotiate more seriously than in the past toward the achievement of stabilizing measures in the field of armaments.

In many respects, however, the Soviet announcement and letter are disappointing. In contrast to the open record of our conventional armed strength, the world does not know what the Soviet manpower level now is nor what it would be after it is reduced. Therefore it cannot properly assess the effect of the Soviet action.

There are still no Russian proposals addressed to the major threat, which is that of nuclear devastation. Still no system of safeguards against surprise attack has been advanced by them, and still no Western proposals for dealing with this threat have been accepted.

The projected troop withdrawals from Germany would still leave Soviet forces there more numerous than those of all other countries combined, and forces of the Soviet Union could always

be quickly reinforced in comparison to those of countries at a greater distance.

There is no reference to measures looking toward the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom, and indeed the steps suggested seem to imply continued division. Neither in the case of this particular problem nor in general is there yet a recognition of the necessity for progress toward the solution of major political problems along with progress toward disarmament.

There is a discouraging propaganda flavor, too, in the Soviet attempt to cast doubt upon the effectiveness of the United Nations subcommittee and to seek to deal with this highly technical question primarily in other forums more susceptible to misuse for propaganda.

Finally, the latest proposal still avoids the problem of inspection and seems to deliberately seek to confuse unilateral, unagreed, uninspected, unverified claims of reduction with a safeguarded system of arms limitation and control.

Prospects for Disarmament

In conclusion, let me turn to the prospect ahead. It is useful, I think, to view the problem in terms of the discouraging perspective of the past, the challenging opportunities of the present, and the compelling necessities of the future.

Time does not permit a detailed analysis of areas of agreement reached during a decade of negotiations, but such an analysis would reveal a marked degree of movement in the positions of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

During the past 10 years, the past 5 years, the past year, even the past 6 months, despite waverings and setbacks, an objective balance sheet will show the gap has progressively narrowed.

An analysis of *approaches* to the problem over the last decade also affords a useful perspective. Disarmament negotiations before 1955 revolved largely around comprehensive, step-by-step arms reduction plans. These plans either began or ended with the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and had to be agreed substantially in full before any real beginning could be made. The current emphasis upon lesser and more immediate steps as starting points may well offer greater promise.

In terms of present opportunities, it is important to bear in mind the many-sided character of the problem with which we are confronted. We will

^{*} For text of letter, see White House press release dated June 8.

maximize our opportunities if we systematically examine and review the possibilities for advancement in each aspect of the problem.

On the scientific side, for example, we must continue to press research looking toward a breakthrough that will permit detection of hidden nuclear weapons.

In development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy we must provide adequate safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes.

In negotiations we shall press forward on the basic principles of the four-power declaration of May 4, 1956.⁹ In this connection we shall explore in greater detail the possibilities for agreement after further consideration by the Soviet Union of the new approaches outlined by the President in his letter of March 1 to Marshal Bulganin.

In our planning we shall seek to develop new measures and new approaches appropriate not only to the existing situation but to the technological developments in such fields as guided missiles.

In the political sphere we will seek concurrent progress toward the resolution of outstanding international issues.

Lastly, we must bear in mind the necessities of the future, the new and ever greater dimensions of the problem, its complexities and its urgencies.

In an age of uncontrolled nuclear weaponry, the problems of national security and defense could assume dimensions which we cannot measure by traditional concepts. Tensions arising from diminished security in the world might well grow in proportion. Difficulties of securing agreement would be magnified. The hazards of an imperfectly safeguarded disarmament system would be enlarged. Defense costs could place unprecedented burdens on the economies of the world. The devastation of war could involve the total population, economy, political unity, and social cohesion of even a "victor" state.

Supremacy in a contest of will could no longer be a prize of war if gained at the cost of destruction of the victorious power.

In facing such a future, two firm requirements emerge as equally important. One is to pursue imaginatively and by every feasible means agreement to a comprehensive safeguarded system of

arms limitation and control. The second is, in the absence of such agreement, to move ahead with equal determination in the development and construction of such weapons of defense as our national security demands.

Given the tremendous complexities of the problem one might be tempted to argue that agreement on acceptable limitation of armaments is a well-nigh impossible task. This is a position which even the most confirmed pessimist dare not take. What must be done can be done. If the human race wishes to survive—and I think I can speak for one very small segment of it—then a way must be found to free the world from the persistent threat of total destruction.

I remain confident that man, who possesses the ingenuity to build weapons powerful enough for his own self-destruction, also possesses enough common sense to keep these weapons under effective control.

Reaffirmation of U.S. Views on German Unification

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO PRESIDENT HEUSS

The White House on June 16 made public the following message from President Eisenhower to Theodor Heuss, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the occasion of the third anniversary of the public demonstration for freedom in East Berlin and East Germany on June 17, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On this day which commemorates the spontaneous demand made three years ago for the freedom of the seventeen million German people of the Soviet Zone, I wish to reaffirm the steadfast conviction of my country that the unjust division of Germany will surely come to an end. The Government and people of the United States are deeply dedicated to the causes of liberty and peace. We know that so long as unity in freedom is withheld from the German people by those who seek to impose an alien and totalitarian system on a part of your nation there can be no permanent security in Europe. We know also that these views are shared by our partners in the North Atlantic Treaty.

The ending of the division of Germany is essential to the development of friendly and coop-

⁹ BULLETIN of May 21, 1956, p. 838.

erative relations between the Western nations and the Soviet Union. The way is open insofar as the United States Government is concerned for the Soviet Government to prove that its professed interest in developing such relations is genuine. I am convinced that the Soviet Union will come to recognize that it is in its own interest to negotiate a settlement which respects the right to freedom of the German people and the interests of both East and West, and will join with us in finding a solution to the German problem.

This day you celebrate is I know a day of dedication. I send you my greetings and together with my fellow Americans I look forward to the time when all Germany will at last be unified and free.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

**ADDRESS BY JAMES B. CONANT
AMBASSADOR TO GERMANY¹**

Three years ago today the electrifying news coming from the Soviet Zone of Germany proved to the whole world that the oppressed population of the Soviet Zone had not been deceived by the systematic propaganda campaigns of its rulers. For years the Communist regime had denied its subjects the means to express their will and their convictions; there were no free elections, no freedom of speech, no freedom of the press. Outside the Soviet Zone there may have been some doubt about the real opinions of the people condemned to suffer in silence. The 17th of June dispelled all such doubts.

The worldwide effect of the 17th of June 1953 can be compared only with the effect of the 20th of July 1944. Hitler, too, had brutally enforced the silence of the German people. In those days the world had asked whether the whole German people had succumbed to the Nazi madness. Then the 20th of July 1944 showed unmistakably that there were Germans who deeply detested the tyrant. Just as clearly the 17th of June showed that the Germans in the Soviet Zone hated and detested the tyrannical regime imposed upon them.

We know that even today the Soviets do not dare to let the population of the Soviet Zone express its will freely. That became quite obvious

in Geneva last year. You will remember that after the summit conference in Geneva there was some hope that progress might be made toward a reunified Germany, together with a system for European security. During this conference the Heads of Government of France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and the United States recognized their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany and agreed that the reunification of Germany should take place by means of free elections and should be carried out in conformity with the national interest of the German people and the interest of European security. Unfortunately a few months later at the Conference of Foreign Ministers the attitude of the Soviet member was quite different. Whereas the Western powers submitted proposals for the reunification of Germany by means of free elections, the Soviet Union demanded negotiations between Pankow and Bonn. Such negotiations would, however, mean the indefinite division of Germany or the reunification of Germany as a satellite state; that is, reunification in slavery.

My Government and the Government of the German Federal Republic will not relax their efforts to bring about reunification in freedom. Last Wednesday a thorough discussion between Chancellor Adenauer and Secretary of State Dulles took place in Washington at which I, as American Ambassador to the German Federal Republic, was present. The two statesmen were in complete agreement and at the end of their discussions issued a communique² from which I should like to quote the following sentence:

Secretary of State Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer emphasized German reunification as a major objective of the West and the conviction that the attitude of the West toward the Soviet Union should be determined by the endeavor to promote the reunification of Germany in freedom.

It is hardly necessary for me to point out the great significance of this sentence.

Perhaps one of my listeners is now going to say that the Kremlin recently adopted a new course. My answer would be that, although we must never give up the hope that some day the attitude of the Kremlin toward the free world will change, we cannot ignore the fact that all the fine words from the Kremlin have not changed

¹Delivered in German over radio station RIAS in Berlin on June 17 (U.S. Embassy, Bonn, press release).

²BULLETIN of June 25, 1956, p. 1047.

at all the situation of the people in the Soviet Zone. The President of the Berlin House of Deputies, Herr Willy Brandt, recently said in a speech in the Bundestag:

It can be stated (and in my opinion it must be stated) that we have heard many rather fine words from the Soviet Zone authorities but that we have seen few deeds which would correspond to these words. After all we have experienced, only deeds and facts can convince us. In the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany there have been practically no changes in the life of the people. Nor have there been any changes in the field of travel and communications.

I should like to add the following to the words of the President of the Berlin House of Deputies. The Soviets today are trying to convince the world

that a change of attitude has taken place in the Kremlin. In the Soviet Zone of Germany the Soviets have the best possible opportunity to demonstrate their alleged change of heart. Unfortunately the Soviets so far have made little use of this opportunity. It seems, rather, that they want to perpetuate the injustices of the status quo.

I can assure my listeners that the United States will not agree to a settlement on the basis of this status quo; that is, the division of Germany. President Eisenhower in his message to President Heuss on the 17th of June said that very clearly. For my listeners in the Soviet Zone I should like to read this message from the President of the United States to the President of the German Federal Republic. [See above.]

American Policy and the Shifting Scene

by *C. Burke Elbrick*

Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs¹

The topic you have asked me to discuss this afternoon is "American Policy and the Shifting Scene," and by way of opening let me compliment you upon your choice of a subject and caution you of my treatment of it. In a single, rather poignant phrase you have characterized the chief preoccupation of much of our Government today, from the highest policy levels to the operating posts in far places around the globe. But you are aware, I hope, that with the time and knowledge at my command I cannot come near to exhausting such a theme. I shall try, however, to suggest a few ideas and to share what perspective I have.

The world scene is indeed shifting—in some ways that are hopeful, in others that are ominous. It offers great personal challenge to anyone connected with the shaping of foreign policy, and a far greater challenge to the nerve and wisdom of our entire Nation.

It is essential to remember, I think, that, while

¹ Address made before the Indiana University Conference on Problems of American Foreign Policy at Bloomington, Ind., on June 30.

American policy must always be in some degree shaped by external events, it is simultaneously and often to a greater degree a shaper of them. The theme of this conference, "Soviet Enigma and Western Response," is both timely and important. But I suggest that it might more properly be called "Western Leadership and the Soviet Response."

The postwar epoch began of course with the West's hasty disbanding of the armed might that won the Second World War and its optimistic attempt to live as neighbors with the Soviet dictatorship. It was only as we watched their efforts to expand their empire by force and subversion that we realized that the Communist aims of world domination were unchanged and that we must stop their advance if we were to insure our own survival.

Today we can say, in retrospect, that by such measures as the Marshall plan and NATO, backed by American military power, Western Europe, the richest prize the Soviets sought, was saved from aggression. As they were checked in Europe,

the Communists turned toward the Far East. Their effort to invade South Korea was blocked by United Nations strength. In Indochina three truly free nations have now replaced a crumbling colonialism. On the Formosa Strait our determination to protect an ally has so far kept the peace.

Finally, when the death of Stalin released the Soviet Government from his rigid tactics, and when the joining of a free and prosperous Germany to NATO showed that the 10-year Soviet effort to take Western Europe had failed, the Soviets began to shift their methods. Now, in place of violence and threats directed West and East, we have economic and political penetration.

New Soviet Approach

As we in the State Department see it, there have been two main causes for the shifts in Soviet foreign policy. One was the development of thermonuclear weapons, which has made the risk of a world war seem unprofitable even to Soviet leaders. The other cause was simply a pragmatic recognition by the Soviet leaders that former policies were not paying off and their judgment that a change of method toward greater emphasis on political and economic penetration offered much better opportunities.

Thus, in foreign-policy terms, one of the chief purposes of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party was to adjust Soviet ideology to the nuclear age. The new weapons had, in a sense, paralyzed the dialectic. They had made undesirable even to Communists the "frightful collisions" which orthodox Soviet Communist doctrine held to be the necessary preface to final victory. By their effort to show that war was not the only means by which victory could be achieved, the Soviet leadership hoped to put the dialectic back in working order again.

The new Soviet approach in world affairs is more subtle and flexible and therefore perhaps more complex to combat than the old case-hardened Stalinism. At the same time this use of more peaceful means in foreign policy is a trend that is welcome from our point of view, and a degree of internal liberalizing in the Soviet Union, highlighted by the downgrading of Stalin, sets in motion forces for good whose final effect the Soviet leaders themselves can neither predict nor entirely control.

This, briefly, then, is the shifting scene before us. While we may take comfort in the hope that the contest with communism can now be fought by means other than a war of annihilation, we cannot ignore the possibility that Soviet aggressiveness in the new form may be more successful than it was in the old. Most particularly there is the danger that the West, released from the fears generated by the open threats of Stalinism, will relax, lose its unity, or lower its guard.

But if the new scene brings dangers, it brings opportunities as well. There are opportunities for achieving unity of a far broader kind than the largely military unity of the past decade. There is the opportunity for gradually converting the shift of Soviet tactics into a fundamental change of Soviet policies—for encouraging the men in the Kremlin to take a more realistic view of the whole international situation.

At his latest press conference² Secretary Dulles characterized the present state of international communism as one of "perplexity," the reason being that "certain basic truths have caught up with it." The Secretary named two. The first is that communism without the application of iron discipline and brutal terrorism ceases to be an effective instrument of the cold war. The second is that such rule will not be indefinitely tolerated by those subject thereto unless it produces a succession of victories. Mass shooting of workers during a strike and demonstration at Poznan, it may be said parenthetically, is not such a victory. These victories, the Secretary continued, have been conspicuously lacking in recent days. Why? Because of the show of unity and strength exhibited by the free nations and by the type of policies embodied in our mutual security program. The opportunity and the challenge before us, then, is obvious. In the face of what may turn out to be a serious crisis of international communism, we must maintain the present level of strength and accelerate the momentum generated by our policies which aim at broader unity among the free nations of the West. For, as the Secretary pointed out, if the free-world countries should themselves lose the strength of unity, due to complacency, or because we are just plain tired of helping each other, then international communism would gain hope of new victories which could help it surmount its present trouble.

² BULLETIN of July 9, 1956, p. 47.

Now that we have reviewed the general scene, what are the specific areas or points of policy which must apply to it?

Four Areas of Policy Consideration

In the past the Soviet methods of hostility and aggression have made necessary the building of defensive power to keep it in check. We still have need to be strong because we cannot afford to gamble our destiny on an uncertain estimate of Soviet intentions, and because we know that military weakness could easily invite a resurgence of Soviet military aggression. Therefore, at the same moment we resolve to maintain necessary defensive strength, we seek reliable means of reducing the world levels of armament.

A major area of our foreign policy in the past has been the program of economic aid. Now, with the economy of Europe largely rebuilt, principal attention must be given to the needs of the underdeveloped nations of the Middle East and South Asia, which need and seek industrialization and agricultural development to gain economic freedom and social progress to match their political emancipation.

Not the least important element of our foreign policy is trade policy. The Soviets practice state trading. We place our faith in free enterprise. The Soviets seek to use trade as a weapon for political penetration of the weaker nations. We hope that increasing trade will strengthen the free nations. Good progress has been made in the past in clearing away unjustifiable trade barriers, and we look for future progress in this direction.

These four, then, defensive capacity, arms control, foreign aid, and expanded trade, are important areas of policy consideration as we face the shifting world scene.

Unity Among Free Nations

I want to discuss with you in some detail today a fifth area, which I feel to be of particular importance. I refer to unity among the free nations, particularly as it is expressed through NATO.

The new Soviet tactics have turned the focus of world attention toward South Asia and the Middle East and thus have tended to turn it away from Europe, which was their primary target and is still the richest prize, militarily, economically, politically. The new tactics have emphasized peace-

ful rather than warlike means and thus have loosened the powerful adhesive of fear which has bound the free nations together.

By this zigzag policy, of turning from Europe to another place, of shifting from warlike to peaceful means, the Soviets seek to put the West off balance and off its guard. They have divided to conquer before, and they hope to use this trick again.

At the time when the Marshall plan was initiated, we were well aware of Europe's value to us. It should never be forgotten that the 300 million people of Western Europe have created a tremendous economic potential both in the natural resources they have tapped and in the industries they have created. If Europe's population, natural resources, scientific skills, bases, ports, and huge industrial potential were added to that already existing in the Soviet bloc, we would face a power difficult to meet. On the other hand, with Europe on our side the total Western industrial capacity is greater than the Soviet capacity by a ratio of seven to two.

Were these the only factors making our close relationship with Europe essential, they would be important enough. But there are other factors of equal weight. Europe continues to be the center of Western civilization, the source of our cultural heritage, a force toward the achievement of the goal of a peaceful world living in freedom. Our unity with free Europe has not only countered the threat of Soviet aggression but has made the Soviet leaders recognize that we are one in action and purpose. As a result, the treaty for Austria for which we had labored nearly 10 years was suddenly achieved because the Soviet leadership recognized the unity of the free world and the pressure of public opinion against them on this issue.

The maintenance of this unity is the purpose of our system of collective security, of which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, is the most important element. It provides the most effective system of defense at our disposal today. Unity is necessary not only to resist aggression from outside the free world but to prevent friction within it. Disunity in Europe has been partly the cause of two great world wars within a single generation and can be an obstacle to economic growth and health. Therefore the creation and maintenance of Atlantic unity is a very good thing in itself, as important for internal well-being as

for the preservation of a united defense against outside aggression.

It has become plain that if NATO is to continue to serve its unifying purpose something more than the cement of fear must be found to hold it together. As Secretary Dulles put it not long ago, "... we must increase the unity and dynamism of the free world by greater emphasis on cooperation *for* something rather than merely *against* something."

"New Look" at NATO

Therefore a study is now being made, by the Committee of Three Ministers appointed by the North Atlantic Council, of ways and means to improve NATO and to strengthen the unity of the Atlantic Community.

The "new look" at NATO is one of the most important current developments in our foreign policy. The members of the North Atlantic Treaty decided that in the future they would not only maintain their collective military effort but would also seek means of developing the non-military side of their relationship.

Political, economic, and other areas of consultation are by no means new to NATO. There have been discussions around the council table from the beginning. What is now needed is that the NATO powers seek the possibility of harmonizing their policies to such an extent as to enable them to settle disputes even before they become sources of irritation and international conflict.

The ability of the NATO countries to arrive at a common policy rests on many factors: common heritage, common experiences, common goals, common fears. But it also depends on common sacrifices. The NATO powers, who in order to create an effective military bulwark against a possible attack by the Soviet Union delayed time and again expenditures which would have improved the standard of living of their people, have made these common sacrifices. Some of these go very deep. In Britain, in addition to an appallingly high tax rate, road and other construction programs were postponed again and again; in other countries, conscription was introduced where it had never before been contemplated—and I do not have to remind you of our own tax burden, more than half of which goes to military expenditures.

Because of these common sacrifices and because of the knowledge that only in unity can freedom

be maintained, all problems affecting the North Atlantic area should be discussed among these countries.

The coordination of policies does not mean that we wish to duplicate, anywhere, the work already being done by other organizations. The economic future of some of the European countries is so closely linked as to have made it valuable for them to join together in intimate relationships such as the European Coal and Steel Community. These same countries—Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg—are now looking toward the establishment of a common authority in the field of nuclear energy and toward a common market. These developments should and undoubtedly will proceed parallel to the NATO expansion program. Similarly, we do not wish to duplicate in NATO the effective work already being done by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the European Payments Union, both of which are concerned with furthering the economic health of their member countries.

The exact methods which will be used to improve NATO and strengthen the Atlantic Community cannot at this time be forecast. As you probably know, Secretary Dulles recently discussed the preliminary ideas of this Government with Mr. Pearson, the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, who is one of the Committee of Three Ministers appointed by the North Atlantic Council. That group has now sent a questionnaire—a rather penetrating questionnaire, I might say—to all of the member governments, which they hope each government will answer and send back to them. On the basis of these answers they hope to prepare a report for consideration at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers this fall.

These developments take time and they need not necessarily be fully developed when the first plan is written. When NATO was first established, there were no plans for a buildup of defense forces, for a unified command, for infrastructure, or a German contribution. These "teeth" came as circumstances demanded them. I am equally confident that the methods to solve political problems will evolve as they are needed, provided we can establish a satisfactory framework.

What the Committee of Ministers will finally recommend I cannot now predict, nor can I predict which problems will find priority in the consideration of the Council. But I believe that it

should be quite clear that our allies face problems, major problems. France has been and is faced with serious difficulties in North Africa; Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey face a problem in Cyprus; Germany faces the tremendous problem resulting from the continued division of the country; Iceland faces economic problems of major proportions. These problems can and must be solved by all of us, working together. Just as in our private lives we would not abandon a friend in need, so must we be cognizant that our European friends need our cooperation now as much as ever before.

These are some of the thoughts I have about the future of Western Europe, as expressed through NATO. Before I leave this subject, I want to say a word or two about the state of preparedness which we have helped bring about by our efforts and those of our allies.

State of Military Preparedness

Let us take a quick look at that situation. In 1949 the NATO military command had practically no armed forces at its command. There were four military airfields available (none of which could take jet aircraft) and limited naval forces. Today, after 6 years of buildup, financed both by the Europeans and by American aid, there are over 150 military airfields, all equipped to handle the most modern of aircraft, and over 6,000 planes. There are about 100 divisions available to us. There are naval forces, "striking fleets" in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Channel, and the North Sea. During the buildup period many European countries doubled or tripled their defense expenditures. Despite Soviet gestures and other pressures for relaxation, our allies have continued to maintain these expenditures near peak levels.

Why is this continued expenditure by the Europeans, and the continuation of U.S. aid, necessary? Has not an adequate military shield already been created? Do nuclear weapons not permit the abandonment of large standing armies? These questions are asked by you and by our friends in Europe.

Let me answer them by saying that the military posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is excellent. The military strategy evolved by our commanders finds, time and again, that two major military problems are still facing us.

The first is the rearmament of Germany. Our defense plans include the strength which the planned German military contingent would provide; any absence of these contingents would necessitate a wholesale revision of our strategy since it would not permit a defense in depth.

The second is the necessity to provide our forces, and those of our allies, with the most modern of weapons. These weapons cost money, lots of money. And, while it would be nice to dispense with large defense expenditures, the cost of modern weapons—many times higher than that of keeping men in uniform—keeps our budgets high.

And we still need the ground forces. General Gruenther, who recently again discussed this problem with us, put it essentially this way: If an atomic stalemate is reached, the Soviet Union will probably refrain from an all-out atomic attack. But they may launch into small, localized actions which we might not wish to counter by loosening an atomic holocaust. To defend ourselves against this possibility we must have strong conventional weapons—and the men to use them.

It is clear that the defense of the West is indivisible. We do not need the support of Europe any less than Europe needs our support. Our aid money makes possible a greater actual amount of United States defense than if we spent the money on ourselves. For every dollar of American aid, they are putting up six dollars in defense expenditures of their own.

In addition to men and money, European NATO countries—and Spain as well—are making a substantial contribution to mutual defense by providing military bases and facilities for U.S. troops stationed abroad. In time of war all of these bases would be available to us. Without such bases in Europe and Africa, our nuclear retaliatory power, which is still the principal deterrent against Soviet aggression, would be considerably less effective.

From the point of view of some of the European countries, the presence of U.S. bases presents difficult problems and represents a significant sacrifice for the common defense. These bases involve many domestic problems for countries such as Iceland.

While these problems exist, they must be balanced against the security which accrues to the entire collective defense picture of which the maintenance of these bases is an essential part.

Speaking of the military aid program, Secre-

tary Dulles said in Iowa this month,³ "... by helping others we help ourselves more effectively than we could do in any other way. . . . The decisive reason for each item of expense is our own enlightened self-interest. . . . Not a single dollar is sought for this program for any reason other than an American reason."

It has been my purpose to review with you this afternoon the shifting scene we face in the world today, and to go over some of the elements of American policy that must bear upon it, particularly as I am concerned with them.

Now that we have gone over some of the details, one question remains: What are America's chances? Can our foreign policy meet and master the challenges we face?

This much can be said with certainty:

Our potential is excellent, materially, technologically, politically, spiritually. In this struggle if the Communists had the assets we have, and we in turn had only what they have, then there would be cause for alarm. But if what we have is properly used, I have little doubt in my mind that the free world can remain free and peace can be preserved.

I said "properly used." That means continued support of essential armament; continued efforts toward appropriate world disarmament with proper safeguards through mutual inspection; aid to the young nations in attaining their full political, social, economic, and industrial development; a trade policy permitting our friends to earn their own way; and not least of all continued success in maintaining the unity of the West, both in the old sense of military alliance and in new terms of political and economic consultation and cooperation. We cannot sit back passively and wait, nor dance to the Russian tune. Rather, we must determine clearheadedly what must be done and then, without faltering, see that it is done.

I am told that there is an oriental idiom for "crisis" which is composed of two words, one meaning "danger" and the other "opportunity." Crises occur in the shifting scene we face, and some of them are full of danger. But there are far more opportunities than dangers, if we recognize them. It is the task of American policy, and of the American people on whose behalf policy is made, to sense these opportunities and make the most of them.

³ *Ibid.*, June 18, 1956, p. 1002.

Lend-Lease Settlement With Poland

Press release 364 dated June 28

An agreement was reached on June 28 between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Polish People's Republic for settlement of the World War II lend-lease account of Poland and certain other financial claims.

The agreement, which resulted from a series of meetings in Washington which began in July 1954, was signed on the United States' behalf by Herbert V. Prochnow, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, and on behalf of Poland by Romuald Spasowski, Ambassador of the Polish People's Republic.

The agreement provides that Poland will pay to the Government of the United States the net sum of \$110,000 within 10 days. It also provides that Poland will assume certain possible claims against the Government of the United States by residents of Poland.

The lend-lease settlement with Poland follows the pattern of lend-lease settlements concluded with other lend-lease recipients. In this connection it may be recalled that the general policy of the United States has been not to seek payment for lend-lease supplies which were lost, destroyed, or consumed during the war. Payment has been sought only for goods of civilian utility held by the recipient at the end of the war plus supplies en route on V-J day.

In the case of Poland, all but \$92,000 worth of about \$12,000,000 of lend-lease assistance had been delivered prior to V-J day. Over 80 percent of the assistance to Poland comprised food, medical supplies, and clothing for Polish prisoners of war. The \$110,000 settlement represents payment for the supplies received after V-J day plus a small sum for whatever usable civilian-type lend-lease supplies remained under Polish control on V-J day.

Following is the text of the agreement.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ON SETTLEMENT FOR LEND-LEASE AND CERTAIN CLAIMS

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Polish People's Republic have reached agreement as set forth below regarding settlement for lend-lease and for certain financial claims arising

ing as a result of World War II. Both Governments, in arriving at this settlement, have taken full cognizance of the benefits already received by them in the defeat of their common enemies, and of the aid furnished by each Government to the other in the course of the war.

1. *Definition.* The term "lend-lease article" as used in this Agreement means any article transferred by the Government of the United States of America under the Act of March 11, 1941,

(a) to the Government of Poland, or

(b) to any other government and retransferred to the Government of Poland.

2. *Lend-Lease*

(a) *Transfer of Title.* Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph 2, the Government of Poland receives full title to lend-lease articles in its possession.

(b) *Right of Recapture.* The Government of the United States of America reserves the right of recapture of lend-lease articles held by the Government of Poland of types essentially or exclusively for use in war or war-like exercises, if any, but has indicated that it does not intend to exercise generally this right of recapture. The Government of Poland agrees that such articles held by it, if any, will be used only for purposes compatible with the principles of international security and welfare set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.

(c) *Waiver of Payment.* Except as provided in this Agreement, the Government of Poland will make no further payment to the Government of the United States of America for lend-lease articles.

(d) *Restrictions on Disposal.* Disposals of lend-lease articles of types essentially or exclusively for use in war or war-like exercises, if any, and disposals of other types of lend-lease articles except for use in Polish territory, will be made only with the consent of the Government of the United States of America. All net proceeds of disposals requiring such consent will be paid to the Government of the United States of America.

3. *Claims.*

(a) The Government of Poland waives all its financial claims against the Government of the United States of America, except those in which liability has heretofore been acknowledged and the method of computation agreed upon, which (1) arose out of lend-lease or reciprocal aid or (2) arose from maritime incidents incidental to the conduct of war.

(b) The Government of Poland will process the claims described in the following subparagraphs (1) and (2) and will discharge the liability with respect thereto of the United States of America and of the individuals, firms, and corporations against whom such claims are asserted:

(1) *Patent Claims.* Claims of residents of Poland against the Government of the United States of America, its contractors and subcontractors, for royalties under contracts for the use of inventions, patented or unpatented, or for the infringement of patent rights, in connection with war production carried on or contracted for on or after September 1, 1939 and prior to September 2, 1945 by the United States Government, its contractors or subcontractors.

(2) *Requisition Claims.* Claims of residents of Poland against the Government of the United States of America

arising out of the requisitioning for use in the war program of property located in the United States of America in which the claimant asserts an interest.

4. *Payment.* The Government of Poland will pay to the Government of the United States of America the net sum of US dollars 110,000 within ten days after this Agreement has been signed. This amount is in payment for all lend-lease articles to which title is received by the Government of Poland pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Agreement.

5. *Other Claims Reserved.* This Agreement does not affect claims or negotiations except those arising out of lend-lease or otherwise specifically disposed of by this Agreement.

6. *Effective Date.* This Agreement shall be effective upon signature.

Done in duplicate at Washington, this twenty-eighth day of June, 1956, in the English and Polish languages, both being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

HERBERT V. PROCHNOW

Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC:

ROMUALD SPASOWSKI

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Polish People's Republic in Washington

Modification of Restrictions on Long-Staple Cotton Imports

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House (Gettysburg, Pa.) press release dated July 2

The President has issued a proclamation changing the opening date for the annual import quota on long-staple cotton (established pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, as amended) from February 1 to August 1. The proclamation also established an interim quota for the period February 1, 1956, to July 31, 1956, of 22,828,210 pounds, which is equivalent to one-half of the present annual quota. The present quota is otherwise unchanged. Accordingly, during the year beginning August 1, 1956, and each 12-month period thereafter the quota will be 45,656,420 pounds.

The proclamation was issued pursuant to section 202 (a) of the Agricultural Act of 1956, which places cotton having a staple length of $1\frac{11}{16}$ inches or longer within the quota which heretofore has been applicable to cotton having a staple length of

1½ inches or longer but less than 11½ inches. Section 202 (a) directs also that an opening date be established for the quota year which will permit entry to conform to normal marketing practices and requirements for such cotton.

When initially established on September 20, 1939, the quota applied to all grades and staple lengths of 1½ inches and longer. For reasons of national defense the quota by Presidential proclamation on December 19, 1940, was suspended for cotton having a staple of 11½ inches and longer. These changes have the effect of lifting that suspension.

PROCLAMATION 3145¹

WHEREAS, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended (7 U. S. C. 624), the President issued a proclamation on September 5, 1939 (No. 2351; 54 Stat. 2640), limiting imports of cotton having a staple length of 1½ inches or more to an annual quota of 45,656,420 pounds, which proclamation was amended by Proclamation No. 2450 of December 19, 1940 (54 Stat. 2769), suspending the quota on cotton having a staple length of 11½ inches or more, and by Proclamation No. 2856 of September 3, 1949 (14 F. R. 5517), changing the opening date from September 20 to February 1 for the annual quota for cotton having a staple length of 1½ inches or more but less than 11½ inches;

WHEREAS section 202 (a) of the Agricultural Act of 1956 (Public Law 540, 84th Congress), approved May 28, 1956, provides as follows:

"Sec. 202 (a). Hereafter the quota for cotton having a staple length of one and one-eighth inches or more, established September 20, 1939, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, as amended, shall apply to the same grades and staple lengths included in the quota when such quota was initially established. Such quota shall provide for cotton having a staple length of one and eleven sixteenths inches and longer, and shall establish dates for the quota year which will recognize and permit entry to conform to normal marketing practices and requirements for such cotton."

WHEREAS I find and declare that the termination of the said Proclamation No. 2450 of December 19, 1940, and the modifications hereinafter indicated of the said Proclamation No. 2351 of September 5, 1939, are necessary in order to carry out the provisions of the said section 202 (a) of the Agricultural Act of 1956:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by section 202 (a) of the said Agricultural Act of 1956, do hereby terminate the said Proclamation No. 2450 of December 19, 1940, and do hereby further modify the said Proclamation No. 2351 of September 5, 1939, so that (1) the quota year

for cotton having a staple length of 1½ inches or more shall hereafter commence on August 1, and (2) the quantity of such cotton which may be entered or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption during the period May 28, 1956, to July 31, 1956, inclusive, together with the quantity of cotton having a staple length of 1½ inches or more but less than 11½ inches which was entered or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption during the period February 1, 1956, to May 27, 1956, inclusive, shall not exceed 22,828,210 pounds.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-ninth day of June in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eightieth.



By the President:

HERBERT HOOVER, JR.,
Acting Secretary of State

Increase in Tariff on Imports of Linen Toweling

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House (Walter Reed Army Hospital) press release dated June 25

The President on June 25 concurred with the United States Tariff Commission's unanimous recommendation for an increase in the tariff on certain imports of linen toweling. The President's action and the U.S. Tariff Commission's investigation and recommendation were made pursuant to the escape-clause provisions of section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended. The tariff increase from 10 percent ad valorem to 40 percent ad valorem applies only to linen toweling (i. e., fabrics chiefly used for making towels) imported under paragraph 1010 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and brings the duty on such imports into line with the duty on similar imports under paragraph 1009a. As recommended by the Tariff Commission, the increase does not affect other types of imports under paragraph 1010. These other imports comprise the great bulk of entries under paragraph 1010.

The application leading to the Tariff Commission's escape-clause investigation was filed on

¹ 21 Fed. Reg. 4995.

August 29, 1955, by a single firm, the Stevens Linen Associates, Inc., of Dudley, Mass. The Tariff Commission instituted its investigation on October 4, 1955. The Tariff Commission's report of its investigation was transmitted to the President on May 15, 1956.

PROCLAMATION 3143¹

WITHDRAWAL OF TRADE AGREEMENT CONCESSION AND ADJUSTMENT IN RATE OF DUTY WITH RESPECT TO TOWELING OF FLAX, HEMP, OR RAMIE

1. WHEREAS, under the authority vested in him by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 350 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the President on October 30, 1947, entered into a trade agreement with certain foreign countries, which trade agreement consists of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the related Protocol of Provisional Application thereof, together with the Final Act Adopted at the Conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (61 Stat. (Parts 5 and 6) A7, A11, and A2050), and, by Proclamation No. 2761A of December 16, 1947 (61 Stat. 1103), proclaimed such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions of the United States and such continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of articles imported into the United States as were then found to be required or appropriate to carry out the said trade agreement on and after January 1, 1948;

2. WHEREAS item 1010 in Part I of Schedule XX (original) annexed to the said General Agreement (61 Stat. (Part 5) A1264) reads as follows:

Tariff Act of 1930 paragraph	Description of Products	Rate of Duty
1010	Woven fabrics, not including articles finished or unfinished, of flax, hemp, ramie, or other vegetable fiber, except cotton, or of which these substances or any of them is the component material of chief value, not specially provided for.	10% ad val.

3. WHEREAS, in accordance with Article II of the said General Agreement and by virtue of the said Proclamation No. 2761A, the United States duty treatment of towel- ing (i. e. fabrics chiefly used for making towels) of flax, hemp, or ramie, or of which these substances or any of them is the component material of chief value, described in the said item 1010 is the application to the said towel- ing of the rate of duty specified in the column designated "Rate of Duty" in the said item 1010, which treatment reflects the duty concession granted in the said General Agreement with respect to the said towel- ing;

¹21 Fed. Reg. 4643.

4. WHEREAS the United States Tariff Commission has submitted to me its report of an investigation, including a hearing, under section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended (65 Stat. 72; 67 Stat. 472; 69 Stat. 162), on the basis of which it has found that the said towel- ing is, as a result in part of the duty reflecting the concession granted thereon in the said General Agreement, being imported into the United States in such increased quantities, both actual and relative, as to cause serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products;

5. WHEREAS the said Tariff Commission has further found that in order to remedy the serious injury to the said domestic industry it is necessary to restore the rate of duty originally imposed on the said towel- ing by paragraph 1010 of the Tariff Act of 1930, namely, 40 per centum ad valorem, and has accordingly recommended the withdrawal of the duty concession granted in the said General Agreement with respect to the said towel- ing;

6. WHEREAS, I find that the withdrawal for an indefinite period of the duty concession granted in the said General Agreement with respect to the said towel- ing, to permit the application to such products of the original rate of duty imposed thereon under paragraph 1010 of the Tariff Act of 1930, is necessary to remedy the serious injury to the said domestic industry; and

7. WHEREAS upon the withdrawal of the said concession the rate of duty which will apply to the said towel- ing will be 40 per centum ad valorem:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under the authority vested in me by section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and section 7 (c) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, and in accordance with the provisions of Article XIX of the said General Agreement, do proclaim that, effective after the close of business July 25, 1956, and until otherwise proclaimed by the President, the duty concession granted in the said General Agreement with respect to towel- ing (i. e. fabrics chiefly used for making towels) of flax, hemp, or ramie, or of which these substances or any of them is the component material of chief value, described in item 1010 in Part I of Schedule XX (original) of the said General Agreement, shall be withdrawn, and Proclamation No. 2761A of December 16, 1947, shall be suspended insofar as it applies to the said towel- ing described in the said item 1010.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-fifth day of June in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eightieth.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

By the President:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State.

Changes in Greek Tariff Rates on Automobiles and Trucks

Press release 372 dated July 5

Changes in the Greek tariff rates on automobiles and trucks negotiated between the United States and Greece were approved by the President on June 21.

In 1955 Greece notified the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that it wished to modify, under procedures contained in article XXVIII of the agreement, tariff concessions it had extended on 59 items. (Concessions are agreements to reduce tariff rates or "bindings," that is, agreements not to increase rates beyond a stated level.) In accordance with normal procedures, Greece then entered into negotiations with the countries to which it had originally granted the 59 concessions, in order to agree upon new concessions as compensation.

Only one of the 59 concessions—that on trucks and their trailers—had been negotiated originally with the United States. It was proposed to increase the basic rate of duty in this instance from 3 to 10 percent. (In addition to the basic rate of duty there is in the Greek tariff a surcharge of 75 percent of the basic duty.) Greek imports of trucks and their trailers from the United States in 1954 amounted to \$430,000. Imports of the other 58 items from the United States in the same year were estimated at \$2.5 million, the most important being galvanized sheet iron, certain textiles, and lumber.

The new negotiations between Greece and the United States resulted in (1) breaking down the original category of "trucks and their trailers" into four items which will be treated separately for tariff purposes; and (2) a liberalization of the Greek tariff on automobiles.

It was agreed that the basic rate on "trucks with driver's cabs only" would be increased to 6 percent only. This item accounts for virtually all of the Greek truck imports from the United States. "Complete trucks," on which the duty was raised to 10 percent, come principally from Europe.

The basic rate on "trucks and their trailers" was increased to 10 percent, but the words "not elsewhere specified" were added as a safeguard against future specification of additional types of trucks separately at higher rates of duty.

The Greek Government also agreed that the

basic rate on "panel trucks," used widely in Greece as passenger vehicles, would not be allowed to rise above 15 percent, the rate applicable to passenger automobiles of similar characteristics. The value of this concession is completely in the future since the present rate applied to these trucks is 10 percent. The concession was offered voluntarily and in addition to those sought by the United States.

Compensation was negotiated also on passenger automobiles weighing more than 800 kilograms. Previously the dividing line between a 15 and a 23 percent duty was an f.o.b. value of \$1,300. In the negotiations it was agreed that the ceiling of the 15 percent category would be raised to \$1,400. As a consequence, the types of American automobiles eligible for the 15 percent duty have been substantially increased. Greek imports of automobiles from the United States in 1954 were slightly more than \$2 million.

The new duties outlined above became effective on June 12, 1956.

In addition to these direct concessions, the United States will benefit from concessions made to other countries. Their value cannot be determined, however, until they come fully into effect.

ICA To Assist Projects in Ceylon

The International Cooperation Administration on June 29 announced that the United States will assist four development projects in Ceylon under a cooperative agreement signed on April 28, 1956.

ICA said that \$5,000,000 in fiscal 1956 economic and technical assistance funds has now been allotted to assist Ceylon, including projects for the improvement of its railway system, the development of power and irrigation projects, the expansion of Ceylon University, and agricultural extension services.

Projects receiving aid are as follows:

\$1,875,000 for the purchase of 15 Diesel locomotives as part of a move to modernize Ceylon's railway services. Ceylon will allot local currency (rupees) to the equivalent of \$1,860,000 to carry out other phases of the project.

\$1,824,000 worth of construction equipment, supplies, and technical assistance to support the

construction of irrigation projects and related maintenance facilities. Ceylon's expenditure for this work will amount to the rupee equivalent of approximately \$5,000,000.

\$581,200 for University of Ceylon expansion programs. Ceylon's share in this program is estimated at about \$1,000,000.

\$75,000 to be used for supplies and equipment for government agricultural research and extension centers on which Ceylon will spend the rupee equivalent of \$3,733,000.

In addition, \$35,000 has been made available for the purchase of scientific and professional equipment to assist the Ceylon Institute for Scientific and Industrial Research. This is a nonprofit organization established by Ceylonese legislation in 1955 which provides advisory services to both private industry and government on questions of applied industrial research and productivity.

The remaining allocations cover costs of U.S. technical staffs, freight charges, grants to Ceylonese for visits to the United States, and other program costs.

Railway Facilities. The 15 new Diesel locomotives, plus special four-coach units to be built with Ceylonese funds, will meet in large measure the urgent need for improved and expanded railway facilities into Colombo, capital of Ceylon.

Through these improved facilities, Colombo, important center of the nation's commerce and industry, will be better able to handle the large number of persons traveling daily into the city and will provide faster clearance of goods through Colombo's port.

Use of Diesel equipment is expected to bring about major operational savings for the Ceylon Government Railways, particularly through the replacement of overage steam locomotives.

Irrigation Projects. The American funds for these projects will assist Ceylon to expand and quicken the work pace of irrigation and linked

facilities already under way or in the planning stages.

The construction of such projects is of vital concern to Ceylon since they will provide land and livelihood to thousands of farm families now landless and will establish focal points for the development of new rural communities.

The overall plan of the Ceylon Government for the construction and development of irrigation provides for a total of 123,000 acres of new lands to be brought under irrigation by 1962.

University Expansion. American funds will contribute to the broadening of Ceylon University's agricultural and engineering facilities and the introduction of additional technical and practical research courses in the school of science.

Because of current shortages of Ceylonese technicians, engineers, research scientists, designers, and agricultural and industrial specialists, the expansion of existing educational and training facilities in these fields is a prerequisite to the development of the economic and agricultural base of the country.

Agricultural Extension Services. Ceylonese efforts are now directed toward full coordination of the various agricultural research, education, and extension programs and widening training facilities for government agricultural administrators, technicians, farming advisers, and the farmers themselves.

Efforts are also directed toward strengthening programs designed to guide farm women in problems of improving farm living conditions.

U.S. funds will be made available in the future to send a team of high-level Ceylonese agricultural and educational leaders on visits to the United States and Japan to study integrated agricultural programs.

As a related part of this phase of the project, provision has been made to send two U.S. senior agricultural educators to Ceylon to assist in this program.

Dedication of Plaque Honoring Korean War Dead

A plaque in memory of the men who died in Korea in the service of the United Nations was dedicated at United Nations Headquarters on June 21. Following are texts of statements made at the ceremony by U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld; E. Ronald Walker, Australian Representative to the United Nations and President of the Security Council during June; and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations, who spoke on behalf of the 16 U.N. member states who sent troops to Korea.

STATEMENT BY MR. HAMMARSKJÖLD

We meet here to dedicate this plaque inscribed "In grateful remembrance of the men of the Armed Forces of Member States who died in Korea in the service of the United Nations 1950-1953."

"In grateful remembrance of the men"—it is the individuals we honor with this plaque. But it is fitting that the organization in whose service they gave their lives is here represented first by the President of the Security Council, which assumed the main responsibility. Those who gave their lives came from many countries. Ambassador Lodge is on this occasion representing not only those from his own country—as we know, they were the great majority—but all who made their personal sacrifice, irrespective of their nationality.

An occasion such as this one is a poignant reminder that behind every historic action, national or international, is the individual human being, each giving of his courage and his devotion. Those whom we honor today were called upon by their governments to fight, as loyal citizens of their own

countries, for a common cause. In devoted service they made the supreme sacrifice.

To their memory it is fitting that we should pay simple and humble tribute. We cannot recall the lives they gave, and only in a small and imperfect measure can we share the grief of those they loved and left behind. But in paying them honor we can resolve to remember always their example of selfless sacrifice. In the memory of their devotion we can find cause to renew our own. In the memory of their service, we can seek to be worthy in our lives to the building of a peace that will endure.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WALKER

We are about to unveil a memorial to the men of the United Nations forces who died in Korea. As President of the Security Council, I consider it a privilege to pay tribute to those brave men who, at the call of the United Nations, took up arms to resist aggression and gave their own lives so that others might live in freedom.

The countries that contributed forces to the United Nations effort and suffered losses in Korea can of course never forget the extremely heavy sacrifices which were borne by the people of the United States nor the leadership and generous co-operation which the United States gave to all who rallied to this United Nations cause. I consider it is particularly fitting therefore that the Permanent Representative of the United States should also speak to us in today's ceremony on behalf of all the countries which gave the men in whose memory we dedicate this plaque.

This occasion recalls many vivid memories for

me personally. As Australian representative on UNCORK [U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea] last year and as Ambassador to Japan for some years, it has been my privilege to know many of the men of the various components of the United Nations forces—in Korea, in bases and hospitals in Japan, and in the United Nations Headquarters in Tokyo. These men shared a noble comradeship that transcended all differences in nationality, in tongue, and in race and will long be an inspiration to those who observed it or experienced it.

Not long ago I stood in the beautiful United Nations cemetery on the outskirts of Pusan, where the hills look down on the fields of silent graves. Some countries, such as the United States, have brought their dead home, while the men of other countries have found their last resting place in the land for whose freedom they have fought, beneath the flag of the United Nations, beneath their own national flags and the flags of their comrades in arms flown in honor of all the fallen. For me as an Australian, it was especially impressive, when visiting the graves of my own countrymen and our kinsmen of the Commonwealth, to lift my eyes to the neighboring rows of Turkish graves and the other United Nations graves beyond.

Today in the headquarters of the United Nations we honor the memory of all these men and we share the grief of those who mourn them, whether here or in distant lands. The fallen belong to their own people, but they belong also to us all. Their lives and their sacrifice were dedicated not only to their own countries but also to that wider loyalty which in time to come will unite all men and women into one peaceful family. We shall not forget them.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LODGE

The United States of America was the Unified Command during the fighting in Korea, and it is accordingly my privilege to speak on behalf of the 16 member states who contributed troops, that is,

Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. With the men of the Republic of Korea, who carried such a large part of the load, these men carried on the fighting, sustained the losses, and won the victory.

The passage of time since these men died has made it all the clearer that this victory was worth winning. At stake was the very existence of this organization, the United Nations. At stake was the question of whether peace-loving nations could band themselves together to repel a ruthless and unprincipled aggression or whether the doctrine that might makes right would triumph and, having triumphed in Korea, would then, without much doubt, spread to the rest of the world. Stated in the simplest terms, such was the issue.

The men whom we remember here today faced this issue. They proved their capacity to endure and to conquer. They won *their* war—and they preserved for us the chance to go forward. Their sacrifice reminds us that we do not measure man's life by its length but by its height. Indeed, the English poet Ben Jonson saw this long ago when he said:

It is not growing like a tree,
In bulk, doth make man better be;
Or standing long an Oak, three hundred year,
To fall a log at last, dry, bald and sere:
A Lily of a day
Is fairer far in May,
Although it fall and die that night;
It was the plant and flower of light.
In small proportions we just beauties see:
And in short measures life may perfect be.

For the future let the memories of our United Nations dead inspire us with the thought that the very existence of the United Nations must always depend on the willingness of the members to back up words by deeds—and in some cases by the blood of our sons.

It is fitting indeed that we here, in the presence of the highest ranking officials of the United Nations, should bow our heads in prayer, as we have just done, and that we should for these great ends dedicate this plaque.

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

Statement by Delmas H. Nucker

*U.S. Special Representative in the Trusteeship Council*¹

My appearance before the Trusteeship Council this year has been a stimulating experience. A variety of ideas—some of which involve very fundamental policies—have been propounded by various members of the Council. Such an exchange of ideas is a useful and interesting experience.

I believe it is fair to say that many of the suggestions that have been made by members of the Council have stemmed from the report of the Visiting Mission.² In my opening statement³ I commented upon our pleasure at having the Mission visit with us in the trust territory and being able to discuss our problems and policies with its members. Because of the very short time between our receipt of the Mission's report and my appearance here, I did not undertake to make detailed comments upon the Mission's recommendations. I believe, however, that during the questioning period I have been asked to comment upon virtually all of the recommendations.

In answering questions that have been based upon the Mission's report, as well as in the remarks of the members of the Council during the general debate, I think there have been clearly brought forth some honest differences of opinion regarding the philosophies that guide our administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. I appreciate the opportunity now to comment upon these issues and upon some specific points of our various programs.

¹ Made in the U.N. Trusteeship Council on June 27 (U.S./U.N. press release 2429). Mr. Nucker is Acting High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

² U.N. doc. T/1255 dated June 19.

³ BULLETIN of July 2, 1956, p. 35.

Problems of Political Development

I am pleased that almost all members of the Council and the Visiting Mission have stated their recognition of the difficulty of creating in the whole of the trust territory a common territorial awareness of unity—or a feeling of need to join together to solve certain problems. We have, nevertheless, been urged to take measures to more rapidly educate the people in this direction. The Visiting Mission has noted that various factors, such as education at the Pacific Islands Central School, will accelerate the feeling of unity.

I would also reiterate that the proposed conference of Micronesian leaders to be held in August in Guam is one of the steps we are taking to create among the people of the various parts of the territory a realization of some of the common problems facing the different districts and the common approaches being taken by our staff in the solution of those problems.

While we are thoroughly appreciative of the feelings that have been expressed for the rapid creation of a feeling of unity and then a central political body for all of the territory, I feel that I should reemphasize that the administration is still firmly of the opinion that the soundest political growth for the people is through the municipalities and the districts. Moreover, the rate of progress must, in our view, be geared to the pace at which the people themselves are prepared and willing to accept new institutions and to adjust their customs and traditions to them without creating voids and unbalances in the way of life that has become admirably adjusted to life on these small and relatively isolated islands.

Lack of uniformity comes from the wishes of the people and is no detriment to any future cen-

tral government. The States of the United States, for instance, vary—some have single-house legislatures, some have two houses. The terms of members differ—salaries differ widely. Yet the United States is unified.

It has been stated that it would be wise to greatly speed up a centralized political development in Micronesia. This implies the wisdom of an imposition of Western techniques and uniformity of methods in such development.

Few individuals in this world enjoy being subjected to imposition. Most individuals enjoy and appreciate participation, particularly in matters affecting their political, social, and economic lives, not only today but in the years to come.

I am pleased that within the framework of this policy it appears that the people and leaders in the Truk District are now rapidly approaching the point where they will desire the establishment of a District Congress. This situation contrasts sharply with that of a few years ago when such a District Congress failed because of a lack of desire for it.

The representative of Guatemala commented upon the shortness of the meetings of certain of the existing District Congresses. In partial explanation of this situation I would like to point out that the problem of travel by the members of these bodies is an important factor. Many of the members must spend considerable time in travel to and from the meetings and hence are sometimes reluctant to meet or are anxious to begin the return trip. The Congresses can themselves, of course, determine the length of their meetings. Although I did agree to a request from the Marshallese Congress that they be excused from meeting this past year, we do intend, as a matter of policy, to encourage meetings of the Congresses at the intervals stated in the charters granted to them.

The distinguished representative of India mentioned the desirability of electing magistrates on a biannual basis. I agree and am sorry that my replies to questions created a wrong impression. We elect on an annual and a biannual basis—not a 6 months' basis.

Insofar as the move of the trust territory headquarters from Guam to a site within the trust territory, which the representative of New Zealand and others have urged, we are thoroughly appreciative of the reasons for the proposal but,

when we take into account all of the factors involved, we do not feel that the time for such a move has yet arrived.

Several members of the Council have also urged that the Saipan District of the territory be brought back under the civilian administration of the rest of the territory. Here again the proposal is one that we can readily appreciate and understand. The transfer to Navy administration, however, was made after due consideration, and the Council may be sure that the Administering Authority will do its utmost to insure that the principles and purposes of the trusteeship agreement are carried out in the Saipan District. Coordination between my office and staff and the Navy staff will continue and will be made as effective as possible.

Question of U.S. Appropriations

One fundamental issue on which we have differed with the Visiting Mission, and on which various members of this Council obviously have different opinions, has arisen from the statement of the Mission that the Administering Authority should increase its appropriations so that the development of the territory is not hampered. I think one of the difficulties in this statement arises from the use of the word "hampered." To anyone who has followed the administration of the territory over the past 10 years, I believe the word would appear ill-chosen. The Council has itself noted annually in its review of conditions in the territory a steady progress in political, economic, educational, and medical fields.

It is true that, if larger appropriations had been made available, we could have substantially increased our staff, could have built many buildings, could have embarked upon numerous additional economic experiments, and could so have over-administered the territory as to have created a facade of various programs, structures, and enterprises that had no real foundation other than the subsidies paid into them. I cannot believe that this type of false economy and overadministration would have been in the best interests of the Micronesian people. Unless the size of the administration is in proportion to the need and the economic life of the territory is firmly founded on productivity, the dependency of the area is increased because it will never be able to support the artificially high standards created by over-subsidization.

The level of appropriation is, to my mind, one of judgment and balance. Opinions on the subject obviously differ. I do not, however, believe that the past level of appropriations has hampered the development of the territory. Furthermore, I firmly believe that the amount of subsidization should and must be related to the needs of Micronesia—not to the Administering Authority's appraisal of the security value of the area. While recognizing the security significance of Micronesia, Congress has approved the Administering Authority's appropriation requests on the basis of helping Micronesia, not on the basis of buying security insurance for the United States.

Transportation Difficulties

Most members of the Council have commented upon the need to improve the transportation in the area. This has long been a problem of major concern to us and one in which we feel we have been making substantial progress. Our improvement program is, of course, not completed. We have entered upon the phase in which we are promoting and encouraging the trading companies and others to take over the transportation within the various districts. The Marshall Islands Import-Export Company has just taken delivery of a vessel which it was able to have constructed as a result of a loan made to it by the Trust Territory Government. This same company is already operating two other vessels that it has chartered from the Government. Similar developments are anticipated in other districts, and substantial improvement in transportation services will result.

Also in the field of transportation, attention has been drawn to the condition of our roads in the territory. I might say parenthetically that the greatest use of these roads is by the administration itself in the area of the district centers. The Trust Territory Government recognizes its responsibility for these roads that are of primary commercial use and is working to improve them.

Availability of Capital

In connection with the mining of bauxite on Babeldaup and the development of small industries, the representative of Haiti raised a point regarding the introduction of foreign capital, the availability of local capital, and the nature of the economy in the territory. During the questioning

period I believe I said in response to an inquiry that the economy of Yap is not essentially a money economy. I believe that the distinguished representative of Haiti misinterpreted that reply as applying to the entire territory. Taking the territory as a whole there is a reliance on a money economy along with subsistence agriculture. There is, therefore, available capital in the territory for small undertakings. The local trading companies, for instance, have been financed by small purchases of stock by many people. As a matter of preference we would rather take a little longer to launch an enterprise if it can be done with Micronesian money than to bring in outside investors with the result that the Micronesians benefit only from the creation of jobs and wage income, for which there is no great need at this point. We agree that various economic enterprises will be needed to further increase the monetary income of the people and the territory. The difference arises, I believe, in whether we should plunge ahead rapidly to create subsidized economic activity for its own sake or relate new economic enterprises to the needs of the area and create them by, for, and with the Micronesians. Our preference is definitely the latter course, and it is against this approach that we are assessing and exploring new economic enterprises.

It is my hope that our new fisheries biologist will enable us to improve and increase the productivity of the territory in marine resources. Initial attention is being given to trochus and other shellfish of possible economic import. Subsequently, studies will be made in the fields of reef fishing and deep-sea fishing.

The Visiting Mission and various members of the Council have commented upon the need for additional effort in the agricultural field. As I mentioned in response to questions on this point, our agricultural staff has been doubled within the past 18 months because we had recognized that increased emphasis on both subsistence and export agriculture was needed. I believe that, as this expanded agricultural team draws up its program and begins its coordinated efforts in execution of the program, the agricultural situation will be much improved.

Attention has been directed to the statistics in regard to land holdings in the territory as a result of the repetition in the Visiting Mission's report of the same figure for public-domain holdings as

had been used by the administration 2 years ago. This would seem to indicate that no progress has been made in returning lands to the Micronesians. In reviewing the problem, however, I believe it is fair to say that since the 1954 report to the United Nations more than ten square miles of public-domain lands have been returned or made available to the Micronesians. Moreover, a sizable portion of the public-domain land is nonarable. Such of the public domain as is arable will be made available to the Micronesians through our homesteading program or otherwise.

Educational Program

I have followed closely and with much interest the comments made by the various representatives of the Council with respect to our educational program. I am in full agreement with the oft-repeated comment that, unless a sound education system is developed, other programs of the territory cannot rest on a solid foundation.

It has been suggested by the Visiting Mission that perhaps too heavy a burden has been placed in too short a time on the local municipalities by making them responsible for all elementary education. The representative from Guatemala has recommended that more aid should be given in the form of American schoolteachers as well as financial subsidies for school buildings and equipment. It has been our firm belief that any worthwhile program of elementary education must stem from the local community itself. The limited potentials of the territory to develop economically would, it seems to me, make mandatory the development of a pattern of local education which can be correlated into the existing social and economic structure of the area. With this as a guideline, we are aiding and encouraging the Micronesians to develop a local system of education within their own means of support. I would like to point out though that we are supporting and encouraging this local elementary school system in larger measure than might appear from reading a general account of our educational program. We are concentrating on using our American teachers as teacher-trainers for local elementary teachers; this program will be greatly expanded during the coming year. Production of text material suitable for local use is being accelerated; financial subsidy for school buildings can now be secured through a matching fund arrangement. In short, in many

indirect ways we are providing major support to the local elementary school program.

Vocational education is receiving additional support by strengthening our inservice work program. Trained vocational experts have and will continue to be recruited to push this program forward. Our new Pacific Islands Central School also will have a strong vocational training program as part of its new curriculum.

I appreciate the report made by the UNESCO⁴ and the amplifying comments made by the UNESCO representative. I would like to assure the Council that the reports of the UNESCO will be studied carefully by our educators.

The representative of Burma has noted that birth and mortality rates were not highlighted in our annual report. In this connection, I would like to point out a résumé of birth and death statistics has been included on page 135 of the 1955 annual report.⁵ This past year our health statistician has developed a systematic reporting system for vital statistics throughout the territory, and I can assure the members of the Council that next year's report will have greater detail on this aspect. I might also mention that at the present time plans are being formulated for the conducting of a territorywide census early in 1957, a census in which international standards will be closely adhered to so as to make our statistics more readily usable for comparative purposes.

I was pleased to note the favorable comments made by the various representatives on our overall health and medical program for this is one in which I feel the trust territory has made significant progress. This coming year we are planning to expand our program of improving the out-island health-aide system so as to bring more of the benefits of the district health pattern into the more remote areas. This will be done by a program of training and refresher courses at our hospitals for health aides as well as expanding our medical field-trip programs. The implementation of a territorywide BCG vaccination program will, we hope, enable us to gain even better control over tuberculosis.

Additional medical practitioners are being trained. Three new candidates are ready for the Suva school this year, and our medical director has hopes that he may expand the number to five.

⁴ U.N. doc. T/1254.

⁵ U.N. doc. T/1244.

Our postgraduate medical training program at hospitals in Hawaii will continue. The Visiting Mission report commented that the next step should be full-fledged medical university training. As members of this Council know, to qualify for such training a university degree is a prerequisite. I assure the Council that we are looking forward to the day when enough young Micronesians will have reached this goal to allow us to launch such a program.

Land Claims

While I have desired to report fully in answer to questions on our plans for the displaced persons within our areas, I would like to reassure the Council again that all possible steps are being taken to remedy problems that have arisen. The logistic situation of Ujelang will be measurably improved with the operation of a new intradistrict boat in the Marshalls. The Ujelangese land claims to Eniwetok will, I hope, be satisfactorily met within the next few months.

Similar land claims of the ex-Bikinians now on Kili also should be satisfactorily met within the space of the next 2 months. While the Kili boat and Jabwor project has been slow in progress, it now has been activated and will, I feel, immeasurably add to the Kilians' welfare. The representative of Guatemala has commented that his delegation has noted that plans for the Jaluit project for Kili appear to have shifted somewhat and that this perhaps might add a disquieting factor to the program. I would like to point out that the plans for the Kili-Jaluit project are formulated in cooperation with the Marshallese-Kili project manager and the Kili Council and reflect the desires of the Kili people. I feel a project of this nature to succeed must have the full cooperation of the people themselves, and I fully hope that the Administering Authority will at all times maintain a flexible attitude so it can meet the needs and desires of the Kilians in solving problems that may arise in their readjustment.

We are looking forward to the early return of the Rongelap people to their home atoll. I assure the Council that this move from Ejit to Rongelap will be carefully planned and that all steps will be taken to make the resettlement and adjustment as smooth as possible.

Mr. President, in conclusion may I thank the members of the Council for their courtesy and the

generous and kind personal comments that have been made to me. As I previously said, the ability to exchange views in this atmosphere is of tremendous value. I feel that each of the distinguished representatives is motivated by a desire to help the Micronesians and to improve their self-sufficiency. May I assure the Council that this, too, is the aim of the Administering Authority.

U.S. Views on Consideration of Algerian Question

*Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

The problem of Algeria is assuredly complex and its solution is at best not likely to be easy.

But we here as members of an organization having a strongly humanitarian impulse must care deeply about every single individual in Algeria, even though some of these individuals may be in bitter conflict with each other. I say this because nothing that is human can be a matter of indifference to us.

We all look to the day which we hope is not far distant when a liberal and just solution will be found which should enable all the people in Algeria to live and work together in peace and harmony. I am sure that we would not wish to take any action or conduct ourselves in such a way as to impede the attainment of the objective we all desire.

Algeria is clearly in an evolutionary stage. There are bound to be differences of opinion at such a time as this as to what constitutes a satisfactory settlement of the Algerian question. But the concern of the United States is that a truly constructive solution for all should be found as soon as possible.

Mr. President, the United States has considered carefully all of the factors involved, and we have concluded that consideration by the Security Council of this situation at this time would not contribute to a solution. That is why I shall have to vote against the adoption of this item.²

¹ Made in the Security Council on June 26 (U.S./U.N. press release 2427).

² On June 26 the Security Council, by a vote of 2 (U.S.S.R. and Iran) to 7, with 2 abstentions (China and Yugoslavia), rejected a request (U.N. doc. S/3600) from 13 Asian and African nations that the Algerian question be placed on the Council agenda.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

International Conference on Public Education

The Department of State announced on July 5 (press release 371) that the U.S. Government will be represented at the forthcoming International Conference on Public Education at Geneva, Switzerland, by the following delegates:

Finis E. Engleman, *Chairman*, State Commissioner of Education, Hartford, Conn.

Kenneth E. Brown, *Specialist for Mathematics*, U.S. Office of Education

Gerald B. Leighbody, *Associate Superintendent*, Division of Instructional Services, Board of Education, Buffalo, N.Y.

Frederika M. Tandler, *Specialist*, International Educational Relations, U.S. Office of Education

Convened jointly by the International Bureau of Education and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the 19th International Conference on Public Education will meet July 9-17, 1956. Representatives from 83 countries, including the United States, have been invited to participate in the conference. The agenda consists of the following items: (1) school inspection; (2) the teaching of mathematics in secondary schools; and (3) reports on the progress of education during the year 1955-56 presented by the Ministries of Education.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

General Assembly

UNREF Executive Committee. Annex to the UNREF Revised Plan of Operations (1956). A/AC.79/21 Annex, December 9, 1955. 33 pp. mimeo.

International Law Commission. International Responsibility. Report by F. V. Garcia-Amador, Special Rapporteur. A/CN.4/96, January 20, 1956. 175 pp. mimeo.

UNREF Executive Committee. Refugee Problems in Jordan, the Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Iran and Turkey. A/AC.79/26, January 24, 1956. 9 pp. mimeo.

International Law Commission. Questions Relating to the Law of the Sea. Report to be submitted to the General Assembly at its Eleventh Session. By J. P. A. Francois. A/CN.4/97, January 27, 1956. 32 pp. mimeo.

UNREF Executive Committee. Financial Rules for Voluntary Funds [revised on 25 January 1956]. A/AC.79/10/Rev. 1, February 1, 1956. 8 pp. mimeo.

Report on the Second Session of the UNREF Executive

Committee (Geneva, 23-27 January 1956). A/AC.79/28, February 2, 1956. 40 pp. mimeo.

International Law Commission. Codification of the International Law relating to Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities (Memorandum prepared by the Secretariat). A/CN.4/98, February 21, 1956. 117 pp. mimeo.

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. Caribbean Territories: Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Guiana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago. A/3111, March 2, 1956. 125 pp. mimeo.

International Law Commission. Comments by governments on the provisional articles concerning the regime of the high seas and the draft articles on the regime of the territorial sea adopted by the International Law Commission at its Seventh Session. A/CN.4/99, March 12, 1956. 49 pp. mimeo.

Provisional Agenda of the Eleventh Regular Session of the General Assembly: Item proposed by Greece. Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus. Letter dated 13 March 1956 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations. A/3120, March 13, 1956. 1 p. mimeo.

International Law Commission. Report on the Law of Treaties by G. G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur. A/CN.4/101, March 14, 1956. 76 pp. mimeo.

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. Pacific Territories: American Samoa; Cook, Niue and Tokelau Islands; Fiji; Gilbert and Felice Islands; Guam; Hawaii; New Hebrides; Pitcairn Island; Solomon Islands. A/3112, April 11, 1956. 133 pp. mimeo.

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. Summary of Information on Alaska. A/3114/Add.1, April 12, 1956. 23 pp. mimeo.

UNREF Executive Committee. Tentative Target and Country Allocations For the Revised Plan of Operations (1957). (Submitted by the High Commissioner). A/AC.79/31, April 13, 1956. 21 pp. mimeo.

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. Caribbean Territories: British Honduras, Leeward Islands, United States Virgin Islands. A/3111/Add.1, April 16, 1956. 54 pp. mimeo.

UNREF Executive Committee. Memorandum on the Eligibility of Certain Categories of Refugees of German Ethnic Origin in Austria (Item submitted to the Committee in its Advisory Capacity). A/AC.79/37, April 17, 1956. 22 pp. mimeo.

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter: Report of the Secretary-General. Mediterranean Territories [Morocco and Tunisia]. A/3115, April 18, 1956. 94 pp. mimeo.

Study of the Question of the Relationship of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the United Nations, Prepared by the Secretary-General in Consultation With the Advisory Committee On the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at its Meetings From 27 March to 2 April 1956. A/3122, April 20, 1956. 3 pp. mimeo.

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. Pacific Territories: Papua. A/3112/Add.1, May 1, 1956. 21 pp. mimeo.

International Law Commission. Regime of the High Seas and Regime of the Territorial Sea. Addendum to

the Report by J. P. A. François, Special Rapporteur. Summary of replies from Governments and Conclusions of the Special Rapporteur. A/CN.4/97/Add.1, May 1, 1956. 24 pp. mimeo.

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. Pacific Territories: Netherlands New Guinea. A/3112/Add.2, May 2, 1956. 18 pp. mimeo.

Financial Statements of the United Nations Refugee Fund for the Year 1955 and the Report of the Board of Auditors Thereon (Note submitted by the High Commissioner). A/AC.79/33, May 2, 1956. 15 pp. mimeo.

International Law Commission. Regime of the High Seas and Regime of the Territorial Sea. Addendum to the Report by J. P. A. François, Special Rapporteur. Summary of replies from Governments and Conclusions of the Special Rapporteur (Continuation). A/CN.4/97/Add.2, May 4, 1956. 23 pp. mimeo.

International Law Commission. Regime of the High Seas, Supplementary Report. The Right of International Organizations to Sail Vessels under their Flags, by J. P. A. François, Special Rapporteur. A/CN.4/103, May 8, 1956. 4 pp. mimeo.

Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Report of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. E/CN.11/417, December 15, 1955. 43 pp. mimeo.

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Report of the International Labour Organisation. E/CN.11/418, December 19, 1955. 25 pp. mimeo.

The European Housing Situation. January 1956. E/ECE/HOU/57, E/ECE/221. 56 pp. printed.

TREATY INFORMATION

List of Treaties in Force

Press release 376 dated July 6

Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States was released for publication by the Department of State on July 6. The publication lists treaties and other international agreements which were carried on the records of the Department as being in force between the United States and other countries on October 31, 1955. It includes those treaties and other agreements which on that date had not been denounced by the parties, replaced or superseded by other agreements, or otherwise definitely terminated.

The list is arranged in two parts. Part 1 includes bilateral treaties and other agreements listed by country, with subject headings under

each country. Part 2 includes multilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject headings, together with lists of the countries which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry into force for the United States, and citations to texts are given with each agreement listed.

A consolidated tabulation of documents affecting international copyright relations of the United States is given in the appendix.

Information on current treaty actions, supplementary to the information contained in *Treaties in Force*, is published weekly in the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN.

Treaties in Force, Department of State publication 6346 (234 pp.), is the first publication of its kind to be issued by the United States since 1941. It is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for \$1.25.

North Atlantic Ice Patrol Agreement Enters Into Force

Press release 374 dated July 6

The Department of State announced on July 6 that the Agreement Regarding Financial Support of the North Atlantic Ice Patrol, opened for signature at Washington on January 4, 1956, entered into force July 5.

The new agreement, which concerns the contributions of 11 countries supporting the International Ice Patrol, will not affect the operation of the Ice Patrol itself but will bring about the distribution of its cost (\$461,566 for 1955) among participating countries based on the current figures of the tonnage of their merchant shipping benefiting from the services of the patrol. The previous allocation of costs among contributing nations was based upon tonnage figures which are no longer applicable. Under the new agreement the contributions can be adjusted annually to conform to changes in tonnage, including the addition of countries not previously contributing.

The parties to the agreement are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.¹

¹ For further details regarding the agreement, see BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 105.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol to amend the convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw October 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000). Done at The Hague September 28, 1955. Enters into force 90 days after deposit of 30 instruments of ratification.

Signatures: Belgium, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Laos, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, September 28, 1955; United Kingdom, March 23, 1956; United States, June 28, 1956.

Fisheries

Protocol amending the international convention for the Northwest Atlantic fisheries of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089) by providing that annual meetings of the International Commission may be held outside North America. Open for signature at Washington from June 25 through July 9, 1956. Enters into force on the date ratifications or adherences have been deposited by all the parties to the 1949 convention.

Signatures: Canada, June 26, 1956; Italy, June 28, 1956; United Kingdom, June 29, 1956; Norway, Portugal, July 3, 1956; Spain, July 5, 1956.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Dated at New York June 23, 1953.¹

Accession deposited: Guatemala, May 29, 1956.

North Atlantic Ice Patrol

Agreement regarding financial support of the North Atlantic Ice Patrol. Opened for signature at Washington January 4, 1956.

Signature: Canada, July 5, 1956.

Entered into force: July 5, 1956.

Trade and Commerce

Sixth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva May 23, 1956. Entered into force June 30, 1956. TIAS 3591.

Schedule of concessions entered into force: Turkey, June 30, 1956.

BILATERAL

Colombia

Agreement amending the agreement of April 4, 1956, relating to the establishment of a meteorological station in Colombia. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá June 7, 13, and 20, 1956. Enters into force upon entry into force of agreement of April 4, 1956.

Germany

Agreement amending the agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of February 13, 1956 (TIAS 3543). Signed at Washington June 29, 1956. Enters into force on day on which each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

¹ Not in force.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

The International Educational Exchange Program, 1955. Pub. 6323. International Information and Cultural Series 46. 56 pp. 25¢.

An illustrated pamphlet evaluating the program of the International Educational Exchange Service of the Department of State for the first 6 months of 1955.

U.S. Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa—1955. Pub. 6330. Near and Middle Eastern Series 20. 63 pp. 25¢.

A pamphlet by Harry N. Howard, U.N. Adviser for the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, summarizing 1955 events in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa in relation to U.S. policy. Originally published in the Department of State BULLETIN in three installments.

Our Quest for Peace and Freedom. Pub. 6337. General Foreign Policy Series 110. 25 pp. 15¢.

Text of an address by Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States, before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Washington, D. C., April 21, 1956.

Guaranty of Private Investments. TIAS 3201. Pub. 5902. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Costa Rica. Exchange of notes—Signed at San José February 23 and 25, 1955. Entered into force February 25, 1955. With related note dated February 26, 1955.

Technical Cooperation—Agricultural Development Program. TIAS 3211. Pub. 5923. 18 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and El Salvador—Signed at San Salvador March 21, 1955. Entered into force April 1, 1955.

Education—Cooperative Program in Bolivia. TIAS 3213. Pub. 5925. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Bolivia—Extending agreement of November 22, 1950. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz February 25 and March 3, 1955. Entered into force March 18, 1955.

Health and Sanitation—Cooperative Program in Bolivia. TIAS 3214. Pub. 5926. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Bolivia—Extending agreement of September 18 and October 7, 1950. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz February 25 and March 3, 1955. Entered into force March 23, 1955.

Technical Cooperation—Program of Rural Education. TIAS 3216. Pub. 6054. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Haiti—Implementing agreement of May 28, 1954. Exchange of notes—Signed at Port-au-Prince January 28 and February 3, 1955. Entered into force February 9, 1955.

Food Production—Cooperative Program in Haiti. TIAS 3217. Pub. 6055. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Haiti—Extending agreement of September 18 and 27, 1950. Exchange of notes—Signed at Port-au-Prince January 28 and February 3, 1955. Entered into force March 24, 1955.

Air Force Mission to Ecuador. TIAS 3219. Pub. 5933. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ecuador—Extending Military Aviation Mission Agreement of December 12, 1940, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington May 10 and 23, 1955. Entered into force May 23, 1955. Operative retroactively December 12, 1950.

Army Mission to Ecuador. TIAS 3221. Pub. 5952. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ecuador—Amending and extending Military Mission Agreement of June 29, 1944, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington May 10 and 26, 1955. Entered into force May 26, 1955. Operative retroactively September 21, 1952.

Naval Mission to Cuba. TIAS 3222. Pub. 5977. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Cuba—Extending agreement of August 28, 1951, as extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington May 3, and 17, 1955. Entered into force May 17, 1955.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Deposit of Belgian and Luxembourg Funds. TIAS 3223. Pub. 5936. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Belgium—Amending annex B of agreement of January 27, 1950. Exchange of notes—Signed at Brussels April 4 and 25, 1955. Entered into force April 25, 1955.

Health and Sanitation—Cooperative Program in Haiti. TIAS 3224. Pub. 6056. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Haiti—Extending agreement of September 18 and 27, 1950. Exchange of notes—Signed at Port-au-Prince January 28 and February 3, 1955. Entered into force February 7, 1955.

Relief Supplies and Equipment. TIAS 3225. Pub. 5938. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Honduras. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tegucigalpa March 21, 1955. Entered into force March 21, 1955.

Interchange of Patent Rights and Technical Information for Defense Purposes. TIAS 3226. Pub. 5939. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement, with agreed minutes to article V, between the United States and Norway—Signed at Oslo April 6, 1955. Entered into force April 6, 1955.

Financial Arrangements for Furnishing Certain Supplies and Services to Naval Vessels. TIAS 3227. Pub. 5949. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru—Signed at Lima January 7, 1955. Entered into force April 7, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3228. Pub. 5953. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Israel—Signed at Washington April 29, 1955. Entered into force April 29, 1955.

Guaranty of Private Investments. TIAS 3230. Pub. 5955. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ecuador. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington March 28 and 29, 1955. Entered into force March 29, 1955.

Mutual Security—Military and Economic Assistance. TIAS 3231. Pub. 5956. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila April 27, 1955. Entered into force April 27, 1955.

Emergency Relief Assistance. TIAS 3232. Pub. 5957. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Haiti. Exchange of notes—Signed at Port-au-Prince March 22 and April 1, 1955. Entered into force April 1, 1955. Operative retroactively October 15, 1954.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3234. Pub. 6009. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Chile—Signed at Santiago January 27, 1955. Entered into force January 27, 1955.

Financing Certain Educational Exchange Programs—Establishment of the Commission for Educational Interchange. TIAS 3235. Pub. 6010. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Chile—Signed at Santiago March 31, 1955. Entered into force March 31, 1955.

Health and Sanitation—Cooperative Program in Brazil. TIAS 3237. Pub. 6057. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Brazil—Extending agreements of March 14, 1942 and December 27, 1950, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro January 7 and February 8, 1955. Entered into force February 8, 1955.

Technical Cooperation—Industrial Productivity Program. TIAS 3238. Pub. 6018. 33 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Mexico. Exchange of notes—Dated at Mexico, D. F., March 9, 1955. Entered into force March 9, 1955.

American Dead in World War II. TIAS 3239. Pub. 6266. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Belgium—Provisionally extending agreement of June 6 and July 23, 1947, as modified. Exchange of notes—Signed at Brussels December 28, 1954, and January 7, 1955. Entered into force January 7, 1955.

Productivity Program in Japan. TIAS 3241. Pub. 6019. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo April 7, 1955. Entered into force April 7, 1955.

Defense—Facilities Assistance Program. TIAS 3243. Pub. 6023. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Turkey. Exchange of notes—Dated at Ankara April 25, 1955. Entered into force April 25, 1955. With related aide-memoire—Dated at Ankara April 25, 1955.

Technical Cooperation—Cooperative Program of Irrigation, Transportation and Industry. TIAS 3244. Pub. 6038. 27 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru—Signed at Lima April 30, 1955. Entered into force April 30, 1955.

Surplus Property—Settlement of Obligation of the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 3245. Pub. 6248. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of notes—Dated at Washington March 11 and April 14, 1955. Entered into force April 19, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3247. Pub. 6059. 17 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Argentina—Signed at Washington April 25, 1955. Entered into force April 25, 1955. With related note—Signed at Washington April 25, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3249. Pub. 6062. 17 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Italy—Signed at Rome May 23, 1955. Entered into force May 23, 1955. With related exchange of notes—Signed at Rome May 23, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3251. Pub. 6064. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea—Signed at Seoul May 31, 1955. Entered into force May 31, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Purchase of Additional Wheat. TIAS 3252. Pub. 6065. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia. Exchange of letters—Signed at Belgrade May 12, 1955. Entered into force May 12, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Purchase of Additional Wheat. TIAS 3253. Pub. 6066. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia—Amending agreement of January 5, 1955. Exchange of letters—Signed at Belgrade May 12, 1955. Entered into force May 12, 1955.

Economic Aid to Yugoslavia—Special Project Expenditures. TIAS 3254. Pub. 6066. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia. Exchange of letters—Signed at Belgrade May 12, 1955. Entered into force May 12, 1955.

Economic Aid to Yugoslavia. TIAS. 3255. Pub. 6024. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia. Exchange of letters—Signed at Belgrade May 12, 1955. Entered into force May 12, 1955.

Defense—Facilities Assistance Program. TIAS 3256. Pub. 6031. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Greece. Exchange of notes—Signed at Athens May 27, 1955. Entered into force May 27, 1955.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Extension of Facilities Assistance Program. TIAS 3257. Pub. 6025. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Spain. Exchange of notes—Signed at Madrid May 25, 1955. Entered into force May 25, 1955.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Special Facilities Assistance Program. TIAS 3258. Pub. 6026. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Netherlands. Exchange of notes—Signed at The Hague April 29, 1955. Entered into force provisionally April 29, 1955; definitively July 1, 1955.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Extension of Facilities Assistance Program. TIAS 3259. Pub. 6027. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of notes—Signed at London June 27, 1955. Entered into force June 27, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3260. Pub. 6061. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Thailand—Signed at Bangkok June 21, 1955. Entered into force June 21, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3261. Pub. 6072. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Israel—Supplementing agreement of April 29, 1955—Signed at Washington June 15, 1955. Entered into force June 15, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3262. Pub. 6073. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Colombia—Signed at Bogotá June 23, 1955. Entered into force June 23, 1955.

Relief Supplies and Equipment—Duty-Free Entry and Exemption From Internal Taxation. TIAS 3264. Pub. 6051. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea. Exchange of notes—Signed at Seoul April 22 and May 2, 1955. Entered into force May 2, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Child Feeding Program. TIAS 3265. Pub. 6067. 17 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Italy. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rome June 30, 1955. Entered into force June 30, 1955.

Telecommunications. TIAS 3266. Pub. 6092. 809 pp. \$2.50.

Convention, with annexes, and final protocol—Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Signed on behalf of the United States subject to certain declarations. Proclaimed by the President of the United States September 13, 1955. Entered into force with respect to the United States June 27, 1955.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3267. Pub. 6074. 17 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Austria—Signed at Vienna June 14, 1955. Entered into force June 14, 1955.

Technical Cooperation—Cooperative Program of Agriculture and Livestock. TIAS 3268. Pub. 6075. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Chile—Extending agreement of January 16, 1951—Signed at Santiago April 27, 1955. Entered into force April 27, 1955.

Guaranty of Private Investments. TIAS 3269. Pub. 6076. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Pakistan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington May 26, 1955. Entered into force May 26, 1955.

July 16, 1956

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Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 2-8

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press releases issued prior to July 2 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 364 of June 28 and 365 of June 29.

No.	Date	Subject
371	7/5	Delegation to Conference on Public Education.
372	7/5	Greek tariff rates on automobiles.
373	7/3	Nixon: "Our Partnership in Creating a World of Peace."
374	7/6	Entry into force of ice patrol agreement.
375	7/6	Documents on German foreign policy.
376	7/6	List of treaties in force.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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TREATIES IN FORCE . . .

A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States

This publication is a guide to treaties and other international agreements in force for the United States on October 31, 1955. It includes treaties and other agreements which on that date had not expired by their terms or had not been denounced by the parties, replaced or superseded, or otherwise definitely terminated.

Bilateral treaties and agreements are listed by country, with subject headings under each country. Multilateral treaties and agreements are arranged by subject and are accompanied by lists of the countries parties to each instrument. Date of signature, date of entry into force for the United States, and citations to texts are given with each treaty and each agreement listed.

A consolidated tabulation of documents affecting international copyright relations of the United States is given in the appendix.

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Publication 6346

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